

The Persistent Economically Significant Cultural Consequences
of the Partitions of Poland, 1815-1918

Paweł Rybacki

Presented to the Department of Economics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for a Bachelor of Arts degree with Honors

Harvard College
Cambridge, Massachusetts
March 11th, 2021

Revised version as of April 15th, 2021

ABSTRACT

By conducting an online survey targeted at a region with spatial discontinuity, this paper documents persistent effects of the Partitions of Poland on contemporary differences in culture and social capital between formerly Prussian and Russian regions. Population treated with the Prussian occupation exhibits higher levels of membership and activity in social organizations; trust in schools, police, and courts; trust toward Russians relative to Germans; and a lower level of altruism. The empirical strength of these findings is combining a sharp RDD (without geographical controls) with the study area narrowed down to 15 kilometers in each direction from the historical border.

Replacing a dummy for the Prussian partition with two dummies for exclusively Prussian and mixed ancestry produces consistent although weaker results. This may suggest that the role of family transmission in acquiring prosocial preferences and behavior is not as strong as expected. The Partitions have heterogenous effects on age, education, urbanization, and income groups without a clear pattern. Although the cause of the inter-partition income disparity is yet to be discovered, improving agricultural conditions and building social capital in former Russian partition seems a reasonable policy implication.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor David Yang, my faculty adviser, for his outstanding advising and remarkable suggestions and to Giorgio Saponaro, my seminar instructor, for his exceptional guidance, superb comments, unusual patience, and generous availability. I am grateful to Kiran Gajwani and Andrés Maggi for their helpful advice. I thank Paweł Bukowski for replication files.

I cordially thank the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard, Center for International Development and Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy at Harvard Kennedy School, and the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University for their generous grants, without which my analysis would not have been possible, as well as their valuable feedback.

Finally, I especially thank God, my family, and friends for their kind support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION	6
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	9
2.1. Persistent Effects of the Partitions	9
2.2. Cultural Differences of Economic Importance	10
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	11
3.1. Key Definitions	11
3.2. Partitions as a Treatment	13
4. A PARTITIONED COUNTRY	13
4.1. New Borders.....	14
4.2. The Exogeneity of the Borders.....	15
4.3. New Institutional Conditions	17
4.4. New Cultural Realities	17
4.5. Polish Lands on Diverging Trajectories.....	18
5. THE PRUSSIAN-RUSSIAN DIVIDE	19
5.1. Peasant Emancipation	20
5.2. Religion	21
5.3. Education.....	22
5.4. Industry and Infrastructure	22
5.5. Rule of Law	23
5.6. Personal Finance	24
5.7. A New Culture in Prussian Poland.....	24
5.8. The Testable Hypotheses	26
6. CHANNELS OF PERSISTENCE	28
6.1. Channels of Persistence in Literature.....	28
6.2. Against Institutional and Economic Channels of Persistence	29
6.3. In Favor of a Cultural Channel of Persistence	32
7. DATA	34
7.1. The Study Area.....	34
7.2. Municipality-Level Data	35
7.3. Individual-Level Data	35
7.4. Descriptive Statistics	37

8. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY	38
8.1. The Model	38
8.2. Assumptions and Limitations.....	39
9. RESULTS	41
9.1. Preliminary Results	41
9.2. Main Results.....	42
9.2.1. Overview	42
9.2.2. Personal Preferences	42
9.2.3. Prosocial Preferences	43
9.2.4. Trust	43
9.3. Ancestry	44
9.4 Heterogeneity	45
9.4.1. Heterogeneity by Group	45
9.4.2. Heterogeneity by Outcome	46
9.5. Discussion	46
9.5.1. Interpretation	46
9.5.2. Implications	48
10. CONCLUSION	49
MAPS AND TABLES	51
APPENDIX	52
A.1. Robustness Checks and Placebo Test.....	52
A.2. Key Historical Dates	53
A.3. Survey Realization Details	53
A.4. Available Data Sources for Future Research	55
A.5. Additional Tables and Figures	56
REFERENCES	57

If you are a shoemaker make better shoes, if you are a blacksmith do a better job on the cart ... if you are a Polish housewife make better and cleaner butter, have better vegetables, linen fruits, and poultry than the Germans have. In this way you will save yourself and Poland ... Learning, work, order, and thrift, these are our new weapons.¹

1. INTRODUCTION

About three decades of comparative Economics research have established the importance of historic events for economic development (Nunn, 2009). The path dependence theory posits that exogenous changes in institutions and cultures have persistent effects on the political and economic trajectories of nations. In many areas of the world, past events have predetermined disparities among nations. In Poland, foreign interventions explain persistent inequalities among regions.

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Kingdom of Prussia, the Russian Empire, and the Habsburg Monarchy divided the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into three partitions. Historical evidence suggests no overlap of the borders with any pre-existing divisions or conditions. Under the occupation, the cultures, institutions, and economies of the partitions diverged. Despite the reunification efforts by three subsequent regimes of the reborn Poland, literature finds persistent disparities in urbanization, income, education, religiosity, and political preferences across the former borders.

This study uniquely focuses on cultural differences of economic importance in this context. Do post-Prussian Poles more often associate patience, organization, discipline, and hard work with success? Do they value hard work regardless of its efficacy? Did the Prussian occupation make Poles less altruistic and trusting in others? Have post-Russian Poles become laxer on bribery and tax

¹ Wandycz (1978), p. 229. Cited in Witold Jakóbczyk, *Studia and dziejami Wielkopolski w XIX w. Prace Komisji Historycznej*, vol. 28, issue 3 (Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, Wydział Historii i Nauk Społecznych, 1967), 2:77n.

underreporting? Did the Prussian state leave a legacy of trust toward schools, police, courts, or other institutions? In which partition is school more often viewed as a tool of state indoctrination? Where are Poles more willing to take credits or take risks? Did Prussian *Kulturkampf* make Poles more mobilized in social organizations? What is the effect of Prussians settlements in the nineteenth century on reciprocity and trust toward this Germans today? Finally, can I confirm higher income- and religiosity levels when crossing the border from Russia to Prussia?

To answer these questions, I conduct the *Partitions of Poland Survey*, the first survey targeted at the 1815 Prussian-Russian border. This contributes 3150 online interviews measuring economically significant beliefs, values, and preferences and documenting the localities where respondents and their ancestors to the level of great-grandparents lived. The number of respondents allows me to rely on the narrow bandwidth of 15 kilometers rather than on geographic control variables that compensate larger bandwidths in other studies. The clarity of interpretation of this sharp RDD is a methodological improvement. In addition, ancestry data help understand migration patterns across the partitions and the role of vertical transmission.

I show that the most persistent legacy of the Prussian occupation is a higher level of activity in social organizations. Furthermore, I find some evidence for a negative effect of the Prussian partition on altruism and on trust toward Germans (relative to Russians), and for a positive effect on confidence in schools, police, and courts. Contrary to assumptions, replacing location-based Prussian indicators with ancestry-based Prussian indicators weakens the results, while higher age groups do not exhibit stronger treatment effects. These two facts suggest that vertical transmission is not the main channel of persistence. The Partitions affect age, education, urbanization, and income groups differently, but no clear pattern of heterogeneity emerges across the outcomes. Rural areas drive

strong positive effects of the Prussian partition on both income and activity in social organizations; however, I find no evidence that social organizations drive the income disparity.

My results are consistent with Wysokińska's (2017) findings that rural areas drive the income disparity and that the reason seems more related to levels of capital than to cultural differences. Moreover, my analysis provides stronger evidence for the latter assertion than that of the author. My paper supports Bukowski's (2018) suggestion that the Partitions caused persistent differences in social norms toward schooling—I find a stronger belief in the objectivity of schools in former Prussia (for some of the demographics). The religiosity measures in my data lack statistical power but are in line with Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2014).

To my knowledge, this is the first paper to establish a positive impact of the Partitions of Poland on social capital. This may be an example of how social mobilization against an occupier in the past can lead to persistently higher levels of social capital in the present. This study also indicates that vertical transmission does not necessarily suffice to explain prosocial preferences and behavior.

Considering little historical evidence for institutional persistence and the newly-found weak statistical evidence for cultural persistence, there remain few possible explanations of the differences in social capital and income. Thus, policy focus on building capital seems a reasonable policy implication for the former Russian partition of Poland. Forming social networks and increasing agricultural capacity are two examples of actions that make sense in the context of my findings and the existing literature. However, the exact cause of the inter-partition income disparity is yet to be empirically demonstrated.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature on the Partitions of Poland and cultural economics. Section 3 draws key conceptual distinctions. Sections 4 and 5 elaborate on relevant historical aspects of the Partitions. Section 6 discusses plausible channels

of persistence of the hypothesized differences. Section 7 describes data. Section 8 introduces the empirical strategy. Section 9 presents and discusses the results. Section 10 concludes.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Persistent Effects of the Partitions

Existing literature finds significant differences among the partitions that persisted to the present. One of the first empirical papers that examines quantitatively the inter-partition heterogeneity is by Gorzelak and Jałowiecki (1998). The authors study differences in economic performance and social mobilization in 1324 out of 2477 municipalities scattered across the country and find the post-Prussian territories outperforming the post-Austrian and post-Russian territories in most indicators of economic activity. However, they attribute this fact to trade and a contemporary cultural import from modern Germany, since the Western Territories (the land reclaimed from Germany after World War 2 and in 80% inhabited by post-war migrants from other part of Poland) achieve even higher performance levels.

A serious methodological imperfection present in this and many later publications (Grabowski, 2019; Dzialek, 2009; Herbst and Rivkin, 2012; Bartkowski, 2003) is the analysis of data stratified at the sub-regional level or higher, up to the partition level. High-level stratification lacks precision due to a weak overlap between the historical and contemporary borders: it neglects that some regions belong to one or more former partitions. Another issue of this design is that the potential results may easily be confounded with the present effects of the proximity of the same regions to the countries they used to be a part of.

More recent studies use spatial regression discontinuity design, which narrows the samples to cross-border terrains and satisfies the exclusion restriction. In a 1675-respondent survey of rural

Ukraine, Peisakhin (2010) finds a higher preference for communal property and more social trust in the Russian part compared to the Austrian one. Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya's (2014) comprehensive examination of the former partitions suggests that cultural differences may have persisted, whereas economic disparities might have vanished: electoral choices, religious practices (municipality-level), and beliefs in democratic ideals (county level) exhibit statistical significance, while average income, industrial production, education attainment, and corruption (county-level) do not.

In contrast, Wysokińska's (2017) paper exploiting municipality-level data finds economic disparities lasting to the present, with a 10%, 13%, and 87% advantage of the former Prussian partition in income, personal income tax revenue, and rural income tax revenue, respectively. Moreover, she finds a 10-17% decrease in the share of rural households when crossing the border from Russia to Prussia. Bukowski (2018) reconsiders education and shows that the gap in educational achievement, as measured by low-stake tests, between children in the former Russian and Austrian Empires is as large as that between Black and White children in the United States.

2.2. Cultural Differences of Economic Importance

Many cultural traits lie under daily behavioral choices of economic importance. Although more empirical work is needed to confirm this direction of causality, a strong and significant association between economic outcomes and cultural traits has been established as a global phenomenon. By introducing *Global Preferences Survey*, Falk et al (2018) show correlations of economic preferences with both cultural variables (such as language structure or religion) and economic outcomes (such as savings or labor market choices). In a cross-country investigation, Knack and Keefer (1997) find that trust and civic cooperation are associated with stronger economic performance. Tabellini (2010) employs the instruments of past literacy rates and political institutions

to suggest that lower levels of generalized trust, respect for others, and confidence in the individual result in economic backwardness within European countries. Algan and Cahuc (2010) provide evidence for a causal link from generalized trust to economic growth worldwide by using individual data on multiple generations of immigrants to the United States.

3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Key Definitions

Convinced by Alesina and Giuliano's (2015) separate definitions of culture and institutions, I consider *culture* as beliefs, values, and preferences; and *institutions* as formal norms, such as written laws or regulations as well as social structures, such as organizations. I call cultural traits *economically significant* when they may potentially have a casual impact on *economic* outcomes, i.e. on human interactions with goods and services.

In the analysis, I group the outcomes as "personal preferences," or beliefs and values related to individual behavior; as "prosocial preferences," or the characteristics of an individual that affect human interactions; and as "trust" toward individuals and groups. The definitions of all variables in terms of survey questions and possible answers are in Table A-1 of the Appendix.

"Personal preferences" include *patience* (willingness to give up something beneficial today for more of that in the future), *risk-taking* (willingness to take risks), *credit-taking* (willingness to take credits), *organization and discipline* (the belief in organization and discipline as necessary for success in life), *moral value of work* (the belief that hard work has a value even if it does not bring the desired effects), *practical value of work* (the belief that hard work, rather than luck and connections, is necessary to succeed in life), *economic traits in children* (indicating how many of self-control, hard work, patience, and thrift are among top five desired traits in children from among

13 selectable), *church attendance* (indicating the frequency of going to church), and *belief in hell* (religious belief in the existence of hell).

“Prosocial preferences” include *membership in organizations* (self-reported number of organizations² to which one belongs) *activity in organizations* (reporting in how many organizations one is active), *altruism* (willingness to give to good causes without expecting anything in return), *negative reciprocity* (whether one takes the first opportunity to revenge after being treated very unfairly even if it is costly), *tax cheating justified* (the belief that, generally, there exist circumstances that justify tax cheating), *bribery justified* (the belief that, generally, there exist circumstances that justify bribery), *society unfair toward poor* (the belief that the poverty results from the society being unfair rather than from laziness or the lack of strong will).

“Trust” includes *generalized trust* (the assumption that people have only the best intentions), *trust Russians more than Germans* (asked directly), *institutional trust* (counting the number of public and private institutions selected), its subset *trust in schools, police, and courts*, and *perception of school as objective* (as a source of knowledge rather than a tool of state indoctrination).

As a final remark, I capitalize “partitions” when referring to the historical event and leave the lower case to mean the affected area. Rather than taking a stance of the identity of the groups under investigation, I refer to the people living in the part of Poland that belonged to Prussia (Russia) as “Post-Prussian Poles” (“Post-Russian Poles”) for the sake of simplicity.

² The respondents were given the following examples: church, religious, sport, recreational, art, music, educational, environmental, professional, humanitarian, charitable, consumer organizations; labor unions; political parties.

3.2. Partitions as a Treatment

A clear-cut identification of the root causes of each cultural difference is virtually impossible. Although I argue for cultural transmission as the main channel of persistence, the cultural differences themselves might have resulted from not only cultural, but also institutional and economic changes.³ For example, it would not be clear whether potentially higher levels of patience in the Greater Poland region would be the effect of adopting Prussian work ethic or of attending better schools. Therefore, I abandon the attempt to indicate the predominant nature of the Partitions as a historical shock to Poland's economic trajectory. Instead, in accord with the present literature, I consider the effects of each empire on the respective partition as one complex cultural, institutional, and economic treatment.

4. A PARTITIONED COUNTRY

In the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, a culturally homogenous Polish population was separated by arbitrary borders and found itself on three divergent cultural, institutional, and economic trajectories.⁴ Although the partitions may differ in economic outcomes, there is no evidence for income being a factor in border delimitation.⁵ Moreover, there is no evidence for an overlap between the borders of the partitions and of any former administrative divisions.

³ As discussed in sections 4 and 5, the partitions brought changes in institutions (property and civil rights, law enforcement, educational systems), culture (through Russification and Germanization efforts and migration patterns), and economy (income levels, trade exchange, and financial infrastructure).

⁴ I use the word "Polish" to refer to nationality defined by culture and ethnicity rather than citizenship or residence. Other nations of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth are not the target population of this study due to a very high national homogeneity of contemporary Poland. The Prussian-Russian border divided lands inhabited mostly by Poles, and also by Jews, Germans, and other minorities. The Austrian-Russian border divided lands inhabited mostly by Poles and Ruthenians (the ancestors of most today's Ukrainians), and also by Jews and other minorities.

⁵ Moreover, while the military and economic potential of regions was a factor in geopolitical negotiations, the annexures were unlikely to be capable of, or interested in, drawing borders according to pre-existing cultural or socioeconomic conditions.

Under these historically informed assumptions, I consider the assignment of near-border municipalities to each partition to be “as if” random. Under the Partitions, a heterogeneity in culture and institutions emerged as a result of conscious efforts to wipe out Polish institutions and assimilate the Polish population. The differences were amplified by an economic separation of the regions with travel restrictions and tariffs on the one hand, and by an economic integration of newly modernized industry and infrastructure to the occupying powers on the other hand. This division lasted for over a century and ended with the establishment of the Second Polish Republic in 1918. The remainder of this section elaborates on these general aspects of the Partitions, while the next section focuses on more specific differences arisen between Prussian Poland and Russian Poland.

4.1. New Borders

The first border between Prussia and Russia came into existence in 1795 (upon the finalization of annexation negotiations) and lied mostly behind the eastern border of contemporary Poland. The Kingdom of Prussia covered about two-thirds of modern Poland stretching as far as to include the cities of Katowice, Warsaw, and Białystok. The Habsburg Monarchy acquired what today constitutes southeastern part of the country, including the cities of Kraków, Rzeszów, and Lublin. The Russian Empire reached present Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. However, the border practically ceased to exist as a result of Polish uprisings and Napoleonic wars between 1795 and 1815, when the Duchy of Warsaw again separated the two powers.⁶

The most persistent border between Prussia and Russia—the one investigated in this study and marked green on Map 1—came into existence after the Congress of Vienna divided the Duchy of Warsaw in 1815 without regards to its internal administrative boundaries. At that time, Prussia

⁶ The border then was reduced to a short strip north of modern Poland.

regained Greater Poland and Kuyavia (including the cities of Poznań, Bydgoszcz, and Toruń) and kept Pomerania (enlarged by the city Gdańsk), East Prussia, and Silesia. Russia made significant gains by acquiring the rest of the Duchy of Warsaw in Mazovia and Lesser Poland (including the cities of Warsaw, Łódź, and Lublin) and retained its territories to the east of it. After Poland regained independence in 1918, the former political border has become what Polish geographers call a *relict border*.⁷

4.2. The Exogeneity of the Borders

Considering the state of demographic knowledge and political reality of the historical period, the exact formation of the partition borders was plausibly exogenous with respect to cultural characteristics and socioeconomic conditions of the population. In contrast to a well-documented scholarly discussion of borders before the Treaty of Versailles in 1918, there is little evidence that the division of Poland was nearly as sophisticated during the Congress of Vienna in 1815. In fact, it was only after the first modern censuses (in 1867 the Austrian partition, in 1870 in the Prussian partition and in 1897 in the Russian partition) when an extensive utilization of national, ethnic, linguistic, and religious factors was possible for the purpose of border delimitation (Eberhardt, 2004, p. 56-7). The 1795 borders cut through economic ties and separated locally homogenous ethnic groups (Zdrada, 2005, p. 10; Becker et al., 2016; Backhaus 2018). Twenty years later, as the five Great Powers of Europe were again concerned with little more than striking a balance after the Napoleonic turmoil, and it is hard to find any evidence that would threaten the exogeneity of the new borders.

⁷ According to studies such as Sobczyński (1993) and Pađło (2014) the relict border is visible to the naked eye, particularly in rural areas, due to varying forms of land use.

This does not mean that the emperors did not consider the presence of major objects of economic significance, in addition to population sizes, territorial areas, and landscape. Indeed, the Prussian Emperor asked for the smaller but more populous and economically prosperous parts of Western Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth upon some calculations before 1795 (Lukowski, 1999, pp. 77-79). Similarly, after the Napoleonic era's border shifts, Prussia could have insisted on capturing the western parts of the Duchy of Warsaw due to their material value.

However, the economic aspect of the geopolitical negotiations was limited to bargaining on large cities, ports, and mines, while the borders eventually followed geographic objects (rivers and lakes) rather than a gradient of economic potential. Moreover, the shape of the Duchy of Warsaw and its subsequent takeover by Russia resulted from military campaigns, which are a considerable source of exogeneity in the case of the later 1815 borders. Hence a consensus among historians that the occupiers draw borders arbitrarily and independently of former administrative divisions and of historic, geographic, ethnic, or economic factors (Wandycz, 1974, p. 11; Zdrada, 2005, p. 10).

Further arguing against any pre-existing conditions, Wysokińska (2017) states that the land divided between Prussia and Russia in 1815 was ethnically homogenous and geographically unfavorable to the persistence of any borders. She analyzes data from the 1808 and 1815 census and does not find significant differences between the urbanization or religious composition across the border. Given the historical evidence against the borders' overlap with any pre-existing divisions, I consider the Partitions of Poland to have been a natural experiment with respect to cultural and socioeconomic characteristics of the affected population.

4.3. New Institutional Conditions

Throughout the Partitions period, the occupying powers eliminated Polish institutions and introduced their own in order to prevent the development and reunification of the Polish nation.⁸ Political, economic, educational, academic, cultural, and other institutions were either discontinued or subordinated to foreign governments, and Poles could not freely establish or develop their own (Wandycz, 1974, p. 260). The Polish people lost their administrative and judiciary functions, now belonging to foreign nationals and being subject to decisions abroad (Wandycz, 1974, p. 20). Polish enterprises lost access to traditional foreign markets and depended on banks headquartered abroad (Wandycz, 1974, p. 275; Koryś, 2018, p. 109). Overall, Poles became subject to new political lives, legal orders, and institutional systems significantly differing both from the lost Commonwealth and from each other (Zdrada, 2005, p. 10).

4.4. New Cultural Realities

Along with the elimination of institutions, the empires took up Germanization and Russification efforts. The occupiers installed foreign administrations and encouraged settlement to Poland (Wandycz, 1974, p. 14-15). Prussia expelled thousands of Poles and Jews from the region of Poznań and colonized Greater Poland with Germans. Bismarck stated that “to wipe out” the Polish nation was necessary for Prussia’s existence and portrayed Germanization as a blessing for the Poles (Davies, 2006, p. 616). Both partitions introduced state censorship.

⁸ These were conscious efforts. In the 1797 Convention of St. Petersburg, which concluded the partitioning process, the powers pledged to “abolish everything which can recall the memory of the existence of the kingdom of Poland,” and with it the liberal political and economic traditions of the Commonwealth’s noblemen democracy. The nobles were forced to limit their citizenship and land possessions to only one of the empires (Wandycz, 1974, p. 20). Social reforms toward lower inequality and higher mobility were interrupted, and the tax burden significantly increased compared to old Poland, particularly for the middle class and the peasants (Wandycz, 1974, p. 21).

National treasures such as books and paintings were appropriated by foreign capitals, while cultural institutions such as theaters, museums, and archives were closed (Wandycz, 1974, p. 22; Popiński, 2008, p. 359). Schools and universities were deprived of their Polish character, reduced, and or even closed (e.g. half of the high schools in early Prussian occupation). The occupiers replaced curricula, literature, and languages of instruction with their own (Wandycz, 1974, p. 14-15). Prussian Polish teachers had to complete their training in Prussia proper (Wandycz, 1974, p. 94, 135). Priests, teachers, students, and other local figures speaking Polish or failing to conform to the German or Russian culture were harassed in some decades (Wandycz, 1974, p. 270, 285; Davies, 2006, p. 618). Inevitably, there appeared a widening cultural divide between the two sides of the border.

4.5. Polish Lands on Diverging Trajectories

The timing of partitions amplified the effect of dividing Poland into three parts of divergent trajectories. The country welcomed the industrial revolution as a group of peripheral regions at potential warfronts rather than as a well-governed integrated organism. The Polish nation lacked a central authority to coordinate and harmonize the rapid social and economic developments of the nineteenth century. A prominent example is the poor growth of Polish stock exchanges in Warsaw and Łódź, which could neither link the markets of the divided country nor successfully compete with Berlin or St. Petersburg (Marks, 2008, p. 234-5).

As industrial and financial activities grew, the economy of each partition integrated with its occupier. As heavy tariffs and migration restrictions took effect along the new borders, supply chains split, dependent industries greatly collapsed (most notably in the regions of Greater Poland and Lesser Poland), and the Polish lands further drew away. New infrastructural networks and trade

routes developed without regards to the shape of the non-existent country, leaving long-lasting deficits of interconnectedness.⁹

5. THE PRUSSIAN-RUSSIAN DIVIDE

In terms of the advancements in civil rights, agriculture, urbanization, infrastructure, and education, the Prussian lands became the most advanced, while the Russian ones left the partitions period as the least developed (Miernik, 2008, p. 332). The Prussian partition was the only one where the central government assisted economic development, with the goal to prepare the lands for German immigration and to integrate the partition relatively quickly. Rather unthinkable under tsar's regime, the Prussian state invested in formerly Polish provinces by organizing human capital transfers through German settlement, offering agricultural credit, and building new dams, railroads, schools, libraries, and museums (Wandycz, 1974, p. 15-16, 285).

As discussed in detail in the rest of this section, Prussian Poland was the fastest to emancipate its peasantry, enhance its farming methods, build a dense railway network, and almost completely overcome illiteracy. It featured a better quality of education, a stronger rule of law, and better access to financial services than Russian Poland. A will to compete with the increasingly present German culture and institutions gave rise to a new culture of work and social life in Prussian Poland. Under the slogan of *organic work*, Polish leaders promoted thrift, frugality, education, solidarity across estates, and social activity. Under such conditions, the Polish population in Prussia underwent scientific, industrial, and social progress faster and more completely than in the Russian part (Davies, 2006, p. 611). By the end of the Partitions period, the differences between Poles had

⁹ In the interwar period 1918-1939, trade flows continued to follow the already non-existent borders (Wolf, 2005).

become a source of mutual stereotypes about the other side of the border, sometimes as exaggerated as the misnomer “Asia-Europe divide” (Bartkowski 2003, p. 328-9).

5.1. Peasant Emancipation

Prussia was four decades ahead of Russia to abolish serfdom in Polish lands. The position of peasants deteriorated under Russian occupation, as the nobility gained state support in oppressing the peasants (Wandycz, 1974, p. 19). The latter “were free but without rights to the land” since the time of Napoleon and remained subordinate to the landlord (even more so over time), paid high taxes, and could not grow the farm (Wandycz, 1974, p. 47; Zdrada 2005, p. 123). Their situation improved only after the January Uprising of 1863 when the tsar’s regime followed most of the promises of the Polish insurgent government.

It did not take any similar turmoil to carry out the reform in Prussia, where Polish peasants acquired full property rights to the lands they cultivated (conditioned on partial land cession or rent payments) and were no longer subject to eviction since 1823 (Wandycz, 1974, p. 70). The reforms accelerated the progress of capitalism in both rural and urban Prussian Poland, as wealthy peasants held large properties (often eventually exchanged for human capital), and poor peasants become landless and supplied labor markets in towns (Wandycz, 1974, p. 70-71; Bartkowski, 2003, p. 143-144).

Solidarity among estates was characteristic of Prussian Poland. While the reform reduced conflict between landlords and peasants, the *Kulturkampf* united the estates around their common Polish and Catholic identities (Bartkowski, 2003, p. 140). Polish arbitration courts and Prussian schools are believed to have reduced differences among estates (Bartkowski, 2003, p. 142). In Russia, in turn, despite the abolition of serfdom in 1864, the government kept the entitlement of

peasants to use landlords' pasturelands and forests with an explicitly formulated goal of sustaining conflict between the peasants and the landlords (Zdrada, 2005, p. 525).

5.2. Religion

The Catholic Church, associated with Polish identity, faced discrimination and meddling in both partitions. However, only in the Russian partition went the government as far as to subordinate the Catholic Church to a council in St. Petersburg, to move the competence of nominating bishops to the tsar's hands, to curb down the Church's communication with Rome, and to ban the proclamation of papal documents without state approval (Zdrada, 2005, p. 15). Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2014) claim that the harsher Russian restrictions led to a much higher a decline in trust toward higher clergy, corrupted by the regime, and to a much weaker participation of priests in social life. The latter particularly contrasts with Prussian Poland, where priests often organized social organizations (Bartkowski, 2003, p. 144).

In Prussia, the *Kulturkampf* forcefully promoted progressivism and secularism by breaking relations with papacy, closing the Catholic Department of the Ministry of Culture, taking over church schools and estates, making priests receive state education and pass examinations in culture, honoring only civil marriages, and expelling the Jesuit order (Wandycz, 1974, p. 233). However, contrary to its purpose, it united the Polish national cause around the Catholic Church and vice versa. The anti-Catholic campaign not only galvanized the traditionally Polish population of Greater Poland to defend the Church they predominantly identified with, but also decisively reoriented the Catholic majorities of Silesians, Warmians, Masurians, and Kashubians toward Polishness, which these ethnic groups had previously despised as a culture inferior to the German one (Bartkowski, 2003, p. 146-147).

5.3. Education

Both occupiers used schooling a tool of state indoctrination and cultural assimilation, but only Berlin pursued the ambition to transform all Poles into enlightened and skilled Prussian citizens (Wandycz, 1974, p. 270). The Prussian administration made education compulsory and saw to provide universal access to high-quality schools providing useful skills and practical knowledge (Macyra, 2008, p. 93). This translated into the lowest illiteracy rates among the partitions (down to 5% by World War I) even though Germanization limited Polish students' access to secondary education (Zdrada, 2005, p. 564; Popiński, 2008, p. 368).

Meanwhile, the tsarist government seemed to have prioritized Russification over other aspects of schooling. In Russian Poland, the number of high school students dropped by half after the 1830 uprising, the most excellent schools were closed, the quality of instruction deteriorated in others, and the illiteracy of 79% only decreased to 57% before World War I (Wandycz, 1974, p. 185, 270; Popiński, 2008, p. 368). Diverging opportunities for private support in each partition somewhat contributed to the disparity. Poles in Prussia could easily organize educational aid, ranging from individual assistance to popular libraries, while such initiatives were restricted by St. Petersburg and thus scarce in Russia (Wandycz, 1974, p. 271).

5.4. Industry and Infrastructure

A disproportionately high growth of railroads in Prussia has left the most tangible and persistent mark on Poland. Transportation infrastructure expanded much faster and more widely in Prussia, leaving a gap in access to roads, railways, canals, and navigable rivers (Koryś, 2018, p. 140). Although inharmoniously, industry grew substantially in both partitions, with somewhat more specialization, efficiency, and decentralization in the Prussian partition.

Greater Poland and Pomerania played a role of a specialized periphery supplying the rest of the Prussia in agricultural products. Although there was little industrial diversification or factory expansion, the agricultural sector modernized more quickly than in Russia, became highly efficient, and generated wealth (Koryś, 2018, p. 137). Moreover, in Ruhr and Silesia regions of Prussian Poland, industrial sectors were large and growing (Koryś, 2018, p. 136-7).

The tsar-owned Kingdom of Poland was, in turn, the most competitive part of the Russian Empire and enjoyed access to the large Russian market (Koryś, 2018, p. 140). The Kingdom boasted diverse and sizable textile manufactories, which grew under tariffs at the expense of Prussian Poland, and heavy industrial plants clustered around Warsaw, Łódź, and Kalisz. They, however, which were mostly state-run and inefficient (Koryś, 2018, p. 138-9).

5.5. Rule of Law

Both partitioners established in Poland their own courts of justice and limited the access of Poles to become judges (Materniak-Pawłowska, 2014, p. 132; Krzemiński, 1894, p. 50). Under these new conditions, the rule of law was stronger in the Prussian partition. The Prussian bureaucracy operated efficiently and tightly followed procedures and the rule of law, as Prussia declared itself as a law-abiding state (Davies, 2006, p. 609; Wandycz, 1974, p. 130). This might have contributed to higher levels of legalism among Prussian Poles (Bartkowski 2003, pp. 133, 292). In contrast, the tsarist administration was known for its corruptibility (Wandycz, 1974, p. 19). A weaker rule of law in Russian Poland could have arrived with higher levels of inequality in the Russian empire and the legacy of bribery that the country inherited from the Mongol conquest even before developing its own institutions (Schultze-Zakharov, 2018).

5.6. Personal Finance

Bartkowski (2003, p. 244, 292) cites higher credit taking and insurance rates among Western Poles and attributes this phenomenon to them being more capable of responding to incentives and more comfortable with using financial institutions. This may date back to the Partitions. Cooperative banks, initially set up industrialists, merchants and craftsmen and later by peasants, played an important role in both the development of capitalism and fostering the national identity in Poland (Konopska-Struś, 2008, p. 375). These banks emerged the earliest in the Prussian partition, partly thanks to a clear legal framework and partly due to a better organization of the population (Macyra, 2008, p. 90; Konopska-Struś, 2008, 371). They developed later in Russia, where a unified piece of legislation was missing, and the state hampered their establishment in rural areas (Konopska-Struś, 2008, p. 374).

5.7. A New Culture in Prussian Poland

During the Partitions, Prussian Poland, and the region of Greater Poland in particular, developed an original combination of firm patriotism and religiosity with a strong work ethic and high social activity (Macyra, 2008, p. 93). The concept of *organic work*, or work at the grassroots toward enhancing the well-being of the nation, was common to all partitions, but its emphasis on improving self-discipline, striving for perfection at work, and moving up the career ladder originates from Prussia.¹⁰ Practicality, frugality, meticulousness, thrift, enterprise, discipline, and hard work have become stereotypical traits of the inhabitants of Greater Poland (Macyra, 2008, p. 95, 104).

¹⁰ Although the patriotic activists of Warsaw promoted *organic work* together with its economic dimension, just like their counterparts in Prussian Poland, the concept did not take root in the mentality of the Congress Poland's population. Bartkowski (2003, p. 301) links this to a weaker tradition of collective life in these regions and a regress of social capital over time.

There was more to the emergence of this new culture than a passive cultural diffusion or Germanization policies: it resulted from Polish efforts to measure up with the oppressor.

A double-edged sword of inequality and opportunity sparked in Polish elites of the Prussian partition an ambition to “beat [Prussians] in their own game” (Davies, 2006, p. 614). On the one hand, Prussian Poles could take advantage of better opportunities for education, social action, and economic activity than in other partitions. On the other hand, faced obstacles from the Prussian government, which passed legislation implicitly discriminating against the Poles and financially supported Prussian-owned firms (Macyra, 2008, p. 89). The elites, inspired with positivist ideals, reasoned that the way to survive and grow as a nation was through economic success rather than military action (Macyra, 2008, p. 91). Their goal was to empower the Poles with German virtues so that they would take socioeconomic opportunities and compete with the occupier nation (Wandycz, 1974, p. 228-9).

In particular, social activists in Greater Poland and Pomerania strongly promoted thrift and savings among the general population; Priests organized agricultural associations, libraries, and labor unions; entrepreneurs embraced Prussian effective organization techniques of Prussians; and capital owners engaged finances and networks to fight against the Prussian state for land ownership (Bartkowski, 2003, p. 137-138, 144, 233, 236; Macyra, 2008, p. 91; Wandycz, 1974, p. 286). Belonging to social organizations became a patriotic duty and prevailed especially in rural areas (Bartkowski, 2003, p. 137-138). This multivariate promotion of new values, preferences, and behaviors transformed the culture of Prussian Poland. What explains the success of this new culture likely is a link between daily life practicality and patriotic motivation (Bartkowski, 2003, p. 300).

5.8. *The Testable Hypotheses*

The historical evidence of this section has shown significant differences in state policies and social life between the two partitions.¹¹ Overall, I expect the former Prussian Partition to more often exhibit characteristics (believed to be) conducive to personal economic success and community growth. The discussion to follow puts forward hypotheses regarding each outcome measured by the *Partitions of Poland Survey* formulated as the potential effects of the Prussian occupation as compared to the Russian one.

Peasants, who constituted the vast majority of the general population (80% in the first half of the 19th century in the Duchy of Poznań), owned property several decades earlier in Prussian Poland, as discussed in subsection 5.1. A faster formation of the middle class and transition to capitalism in Prussian Poland may suggest a higher concentration of preferences such as delayed gratification and hard work (both in its practical and moral aspects).¹² In contrast to the Russian government, Prussia did not purposefully leave any conflict-generating rules after the social reform, and thus the level of negative reciprocity should be lower in this part of Poland.

The universally provided Prussian schooling aimed to Germanize the Poles as much as to enlighten all citizens, while the scarcely available Russian schooling seemed to primarily focus on Russification (as explained in subsection 5.3). Thus, I hypothesize that Poles living in the former Prussian part more often trust school as an institution; and that they believe in school as an objective

¹¹ Given a multitude of parallel phenomena and their variation in time, I could only present select generalizations of historical trends. Therefore, my synthesis so far may carry some degree of subjectivity and imprecision. This synthesis, however, serves the formulation of hypotheses to be tested empirically in the sections to follow.

¹² Studying the economic success of England, Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) argue that when the rich and powerful rely on rental income, they develop a taste for leisure, but when wealth is accessible to the middle class through economic activity, they develop patience and hard work.

source of knowledge rather than a tool of state indoctrination. I also anticipate these Poles to more often prefer that their children have the traits that the Prussian school would likely instill in students, i.e. honesty, responsibility, determination, leadership, patience, hard work, self-control, and thrift.

The Prussian state honored the rule of law and made its administration more resistant to corruption than the tsar's regime (subsection 5.5). Therefore, I expect Poles from the Prussian partition to exhibit higher levels of trust toward public institutions. I also believe them to more often agree that success is associated with hard work rather than with luck or connections. Assuming that these Poles came to personally appreciate the rule of law, they should less often justify tax cheating or bribery.

The Polish culture that emerged under the Prussian partition seemed to value hard work, good organization, social activity, solidarity, and religiosity, as discussed in subsection 5.7. Given these prosocial values, these Poles probably feel less need to revenge, appreciate hard work even if it does not bring benefits, and believe that being organized and disciplined is necessary for success in life. Even though stereotypes indicate the opposite, I follow the historical narrative in suggesting that Prussian Poles more often assume the good intentions of others and are more willing to offer funds for good causes. Despite historically better socioeconomic opportunities in Prussia, I anticipate that the tradition of solidarity motivates a more favorable outlook on the poor (which emphasizes poverty as a result of the society being unfair rather than the poor being lazy or weak-willed).

I also expect Prussian Poles to be more frequent churchgoers and more active members of social organizations (subsections 5.2; 5.7). The credibility that the Catholic Church retained despite the *Kulturkampf* further suggests stronger religious beliefs and attendance in Prussia. A larger growth of cooperative banks in rural areas could imply more credit-taking in post-Prussian Poland

(subsection 5.6). Considering that the German colonization of the Prussian partition familiarized Poles with ordinary citizens (and not just the oppressive administration) of Prussia, and that these Poles felt proud to be a part of the “West” rather than the “East,” I conjure (though somewhat hesitantly) that post-Prussian Poles are more likely than post-Russian Poles to trust Germans today.

6. CHANNELS OF PERSISTENCE

6.1. Channels of Persistence in Literature

Culture and institutions are two potential channels of persistence linking past historical shocks to present-day disparities. However, it is not straightforward to disentangle these two channels, since culture shapes institutions, while institutions preserve culture (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). Based on an extensive literature review, Alesina and Giuliano (2015) conclude that both are complementary and that the way they jointly impact economic growth is yet to be investigated by researchers. However, due to a more formal nature of institutions, their persistence seems easier to track. Institutions change when laws and regulations change, both often documented in historical records. Nonmaterial culture, in turn, is more intangible and fluid and thus requires an active effort to observe and immortalize.

Persistent cultural transmission takes two main forms: vertical, from generation to generation, and horizontal, from peers to peers. Bisin and Verdier (2011) introduce empirical literature finding evidence for vertical transmission in areas such as fertility, religiosity, consumption choices, generalized trust, and female labor force participation and evidence for horizontal transmission of civic participation and female labor force participation. In a prominent example of a long persistence mainly via vertical transmission, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) find that the trans-

Atlantic slave trade that ended over a century ago causally explains higher levels of mistrust today in individuals whose ancestors had been affected.

6.2. Against Institutional and Economic Channels of Persistence

Upon a consideration of historical sources, I believe that differences neither in political and economic institutions nor in levels of capital could have persisted from the Partitions to the present. Otherwise, such differences would have to have endured three regimes, each replacing the previous one's institutions and restoring unity in its own way: the Second Polish Republic's reunification efforts, the Polish People's Republic's nationalization policies, and the Third Polish Republic's sustainable growth programs. There may exist inter-partition differences in the performance of institutions, such as litigation times, but these most likely come from differences in informal norms of behavior between the particular members of these institutions, since differences in formal norms do not exist anymore.

After Poland regained independence in 1918, the society and subsequent Polish governments set institutional reunification as one of its priorities, even though the process was long and complex. Before the introduction of Polish legislation, each partition relied on the laws of its former occupier (e.g. an all-Polish criminal code was published only in 1934; Bartkowski, 2003, p. 195-6). Similarly, local government administration had different structures across the partitions, and equivalent posts did not entail the same competences (Bartkowski, 2003, p. 195). Many political parties non-governmental institutions, and other forms of social organizations still operated only within one or two partitions (Bartkowski, 2003, p. 195).

As a remedy, the Second Republic's government transferred money to the underdeveloped regions, set up or replaced local administration units, and introduced new and standardized

schooling, healthcare, and transportation systems across the country (Bartkowski, 2003, p. 196). New private organizations emerged nationally, old ones expanded to other partitions (Bartkowski, 2003, p. 196). Thus, during the interwar period, there were active efforts to lessen institutional differences.

The Communist regime installed by Moscow after the war wiped out the previous political and economic system and replaced it with its own, Soviet-style rule and centrally planned economy. It collectivized farms and factories and took over almost all institutions such as banks, universities, schools. By 1949, the state had monopolized the wholesale trade, and taken over 90% of businesses (Davies, 2006, p. 1027, 1030). Former capital owners were expropriated, and thus financial capital ceased to be transmitted vertically within families.

The regime took the elimination of regional disparities in areas such as industry, construction, communication, education, cultural institutions, or healthcare as one of its priorities (Miernik, 2008, p. 337). Through an enforced industrialization process involving investments primarily targeted at areas with deficient capital and excessive labor supply, the central planner managed to shift the center of gravity eastward (Miernik, 2008, p. 334; Bartkowski, 2003, p. 197). Importantly, however, the government deprioritized reducing regional differences in rural Poland, as its policy toward agriculture was rather exploitative (Bartkowski 2003, p. 197-8). The institutional channel does not seem to have persisted under the socialist rule, while economic differences across regions were vastly reduced.

A third institutional shock occurred as an aftermath of the 1989 transformation to the Third Polish Republic, a parliamentary democracy and free-market economy. For the most part, a legal and institutional continuity has been preserved from the Communist state, and contemporary Poland continues to be a unitary country. The central government continues to redistribute public resources

to the less developed regions of the country, accompanied by European Union's sustainable development programs. Considering the reunification policies and institutional turnovers in the modern history of Poland, it is challenging to find institutional channels of persistence of regional disparities.

Wysokinska (2017), however, argues for the institutional channel, citing significant differences in farm sizes and shares of agricultural lands and of rural households. (Importantly, these indicated variables fall outside of the definition of *institutions* as formal norms or social structures, and thus I rather consider them as forms of capital.)

To exclude the cultural channel, she compares the data on economic performance from two kinds of post-Prussian lands of contemporary Poland: The first one are the territories that have been Polish for several centuries and whose population primarily consists of Poles whose ancestors lived under the Prussian rule. The second one are the territories that were German before World War II and whose population primarily consists of Poles whose ancestors lived under the Russian rule. Having observed no significant differences in the economic performance between these two populations of post-Prussian lands, the author concludes that the cultural differences that emerged under the Partitions do not translate into economic outcomes.

However, the Wysokińska (2017) does not take into consideration migration effects or differences in the characteristics of the of acquired lands. The existing cultural differences between the two populations living today in the post-Prussian lands result not only from belonging to a different partition but also from the history of forced migration. Becker et al. (2020) shows that the subset of the population that was forced to migrate from the eastern territories the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the territories annexed by Poland in 1945 is significantly more educated today

than other Poles living in the same area (whose ancestors inhabited the lands as a Polish minority or whose ancestors migrated there voluntarily from other parts of Poland).

The authors explain that a shift away from material possessions in response to the migration shock caused an upward shift in human capital investment. These Poles could then benefit from higher qualifications thanks to choosing more often urban areas as the place of settlement; they also enjoyed abundance of land and infrastructure of higher quality and quantity than in the partitioned lands (Koryś, 2018, p. 289; Miernik, 2008, p. 334).¹³ This historical evidence suggests that, despite all these advantages, the resettled post-Russian population of Poles merely converged with rather than surpassed post-Prussian Poles in terms of income.

6.3. In Favor of a Cultural Channel of Persistence

In contrast, the cultural channel seems compelling due to the role the Polish culture and tradition played in preserving the national identity despite institutional and economic changes. Faced with external threats, such as those from the 19th-century occupiers, Poles united around their families and local communities, which plausibly led to a reinforcement of local identities (Bartkowski (2003). Although cultural differences also gradually faded away due to the advent of mass media, easier communication, migrations and were further reduced by culture-impacting institutions such as schools, there is little evidence for efforts targeted at reducing cultural differences per se.

¹³ Note that this refers to the lands acquired from Germany after World War II, so the 19th-century Prussia proper (outside my study area), rather than to Polish Prussia (includes my study area). Upon moving there, Post-*Russian* Poles inherited the capital.

A case study of the Golub-Dobrzyń municipality by Holzer et al. (1980) lends credence to this conjecture. Before 1951, Golub and Dobrzyń used to be two administratively separate towns facing each other from the opposite banks of the river. Under Partitions, Golub belonged to Prussia, and Dobrzyń—to Russia. Having acknowledged some pre-existing differences in Jewish minority share and urbanization levels between the towns, the research team attempted to elicit the cultural differences that most likely resulted from the partitions. To that end, the team ran a qualitative survey of 155 respondents on beliefs, values, habits, and opinions about the other town.

Respondents from both towns agreed that the population of Golub was more hard-working, systematic, organized, solid, persistent, reliable, frugal, and thrifty than Dobrzyń. Golub's inhabitants described themselves as nicer, better mannered, and cleaner, while Dobrzyń's inhabitants perceived Golubians as more reserved and stricter. The teachers of Golub-Dobrzyń perceived their students from Golub as more polite, diligent, and civic. The supreme judge of the local court revealed that the population of Dobrzyń more often lied in the court, started street fights, abused alcohol, and neglected taxes. The pollsters also find in Golub a more important role of the father, a better position of the woman in family, higher expectations with regards to the education of children, more emphasis on "time is money" in raising children, and a more Germanized vocabulary. They described the people of Dobrzyń as more sociable, hospitable, overspending, and religious.

Consistent with the dominant historical narrative, these responses remain informative even though they could have captured mutual prejudices and stereotypes more than actual differences. Considering historical evidence in favor of cultural transmission and against most institutional channels, my paper emphasizes cultural disparities as the channel through which past institutional and cultural changes caused persistent differences in political and economic outcomes.

7. DATA

7.1. *The Study Area*

The study area, shown displayed on Map 2, is bound by the distance of 60km from the relict border, similarly to Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2014) and Bukowski (2018). This bandwidth ensures a large number of observations. By limiting the observations to such a small area, cross-border differences can plausibly be attributed to partitions rather than other factors such as contemporary cultural import from abroad.¹⁴

The choice of municipalities within the bandwidth and the assignment of partitions to each of them relies on Bukowski (2018)'s replication dataset. The fact that relict borders lie within contemporary boundaries for a small number of municipalities may occasionally make the assignment of a partition to a particular individual inaccurate (if they lived in the Prussian part of a mostly Russian municipality, for example), thus generating noise and increasing standard errors. A locality-level analysis would further increase the precision of estimates. (While not utilized in this paper, such an analysis will be operational for future research thanks to with the *Partitions of Poland Survey*.)

All of the lands considered in this study belonged to Prussia before 1815, mostly overlapping with the territories acquired during the first two partitions of Poland. Therefore, no municipality included changed partitions at any point. Moreover, none of the municipalities had ever belonged to Russia before 1815 (Żurawski vel Grajewski 2015, p. 99). However, the municipalities differ in the numbers of years they had been taken over from Poland by Prussia before 1815. (Although this may

¹⁴ At the same time, however, combined results from both groups carry a convincing degree of external validity thanks to the focus of all observations at a rough center of the country.

be another source of random error, accounting for these differences is beyond the scope of this study.)

7.2. Municipality-Level Data

The municipality-level data in my study come from two sources: Bukowski's (2018) replication files and the Local Data Bank of the Central Statistical Office (CSO) of Poland. I utilize Bukowski's (2018) classification of municipalities by partition and calculation of distances of municipalities to the historic borders. I rely on Bukowski's (2018) extraction of municipality geographical coordinates, altitude, precipitation, and temperature data originally coming from the WorldClim.org project (Hijmans et al., 2005). Except for the share of people with higher education, I drew all other municipality-level variables directly from the Polish CSO's Local Data Bank.

7.3. Individual-Level Data

All individual-level data in my dataset come from the *Partitions of Poland Survey*, an online study which I have conducted for the purpose of this thesis. The full dataset contains answers from of 3,150 respondents from 379 municipalities of Poland located within 60 kilometers from the 1815-1918 borders between former Prussian and Russian partitions. Maps 3.1 and 3.2 visualize their geographical distribution. After dropping observations with interview lengths smaller than five minutes, 3,061 respondents from 379 municipalities are left. After dropping cities of above 100 thousand citizens, 2204 respondents from 373 municipalities remain. When 45-, 30-, and 15-kilometer bandwidths are applied, there are 1694, 1168, 571 respondents and 270, 183, 90 municipalities left, respectively. The respondents answered 17 main questions related to their beliefs, values, and preferences of economic importance followed by 12 questions the localities where they

or they ancestors lived and 7 other demographic questions identifying their socioeconomic status, religiosity, and social activity.

In addition to several questions of my own, most are largely based on the *Global Preferences Survey* and the *World Values Survey*, the *Social Diagnosis*, and the *Ancestry Survey*. Many of the questions chosen have been experimentally validated (especially the ones drawn from the GPS), and all are comparable with measures most commonly used in the economic literature. However, I modified the original wording (including translation) and form of presentation of these question in order to better fit the goal and format of the survey.

Answers to questions about beliefs and preferences on a 1-10 scale directly enter my dataset as variables measuring the following individual traits (defined in subsection 3.1): generalized trust, trust toward Germans in comparison to Russians, patience, negative reciprocity, cognitive ability, altruism, credit taking, risk-taking and beliefs on the moral value of hard work, the practical value of hard work and of discipline and organization, tax cheating, bribery, objectivity of schooling, and unfairness of poverty. Other variables capture answers to questions about employment, career choices, income, and education level. Based on locality identifiers, I generate variables denoting the former partition in which respondents and their family members lived. I also construct a variable indicating how many economically important traits the respondent has selected from among all desirable traits in children and several variables indicating institutional trust based on particular institutions selected in the question.

Figures A-1.1-A-1.4 at the end of the Appendix show that the distributions of answers to substantially differ by question but not that much by partition. In addition to suggesting that differences between partitions are relatively small, this probably indicates a good overall comprehension of questions and rather thoughtful answers to each of them. This is confirmed by the

median time of taking the survey being 10 minutes and 40 seconds, which is slightly more than expected. Section A.3 in the Appendix further discusses realization details and data quality. Table A-1 in the Appendix lists variables along with the questions they correspond to and the sources of these questions.

7.4. Descriptive Statistics

The municipality-level statistics from Table 1.1 to a large extent replicate the summary statistics from Bukowski (2018) and Wysokinska (2017). I confirm much higher levels of post-secondary education, urbanization, and population density in former Prussia in addition to varying small differences in climate and demographic structure.¹⁵ Importantly, I detect that urbanization is still about 12% higher (at the 99% confidence level) in the post-Prussian part even within 20 kilometers from the border. Having updated most variables to 2019, I still observe lower registered unemployment as well as higher income and general tax revenues as raw statistically significant differences. Finally, Prussian Poland remains more politically liberal, as the higher support for the liberal Civic Coalition in 2019 and lower support for conservative Andrzej Duda 2020 shows, and slightly less politically mobilized.

Table 1.2 displays individual-level statistics from the main dataset based on my survey. Slightly more respondents live in post-Prussian municipalities (1,624, or 53% of the sample). Respondents from the Prussian partition are also, on average, farther from the border (which is partially driven by Bydgoszcz and Poznań, as the mean distance in the Prussian part reduces to about

¹⁵ Differences in female share, each age group share, elevation, temperature, and precipitation are significant but very small. The differences in shares of each age group show an alternating pattern, which is difficult to explain. However, sex and age are weighted to achieve a balance in my individual-level sample. Former Prussia is about 21 meters lower and negligibly wetter and colder. Even if the geographic differences matter somewhat, the distance from the border seems a sufficient control.

33 km, compared to 1 km in the Russian part, when cities above 100 thousand citizens are dropped). Importantly, about 65% respondents from the post-Prussian part and 75% from the post-Russian part have all of their (optionally reported) ancestors, up to great-grandfathers, from the same partition as they currently live in. This may show a pattern of past migration to the historically more prosperous Prussian part and suggests that contemporary higher net migration in former Prussia may be partly driven by flow from the former Russian part (in addition to immigration from the post-Austrian part and international emigration from the post-Russian part).

Compared to the post-Russian part, the former Prussian partition has lower shares of females, young and middle-aged adults, and a larger share of adults above 60, but these differences are small. Consistent with municipality-level averages and historical and economic literature, respondents from the former Prussian partition less often come from rural areas, more often are employed and better educated, have higher incomes, and work longer hours, although all these differences are relatively small and insignificant (at the 5% level).

In both partitions, there is an overrepresentation of women and young and middle-aged adults. Although the sample seems better educated than the general population (consistent with the demographic structure of the online panels), there are no municipality-level current data available to confirm it. The sample is more rural and more unemployed than the general population (the latter variable, however, is more strongly affected by comparing the pre-pandemic 2019 to early 2021).

8. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

8.1. The Model

My empirical strategy exploits a spatial discontinuity between the former partitions of Poland, similarly to Grosfeld-Zhuravskaya (2014), Wysokinska (2017), and Bukowski (2018).

Although the literature utilizes geographic controls, such as the distance from the border, I solely focus on narrowing geographic bandwidth for a clearer interpretation. The formula is:

$$Y_i = \alpha X_{i,m} + \gamma V + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

For each individual I located in municipality m , the variable Y represents a persistent economically significant cultural outcome, the binary X indicates the effect of the Prussian Empire (with the Russian Empire constituting the baseline), the vector V controls for a selection of control variables, and the random term ε captures noise.

8.2. Assumptions and Limitations

Considering historical facts, this specification plausibly passes theoretical assumptions of the model: border exogeneity, pre-existing conditions, manipulation of treatment status, and discontinuous exposure to treatment. In addition, the model takes into account a potential heterogenous intensity of treatment and the distinction of direct effects on culture from those driven by socioeconomic differences. Nevertheless, these assumptions could be violated under an alternative historical perspective which would find evidence for a more geographically detailed decision-making during the Congress of Vienna (or shortly afterwards) or for cross-border movements in the eve of the 1815 delimitation. Moreover, there are limitations to online survey as a data collection method, such as external validity, a selection bias, and randomization.

The historical perspective outlined in subsection 4.2 suggests a causal interpretation of the potential differences. The shape of the 1815-1918 inter-partition borders was very likely exogenous with respect to the cultural and economic traits of the divided population, even if the assignments of broader regions had not been random. The borders divided homogenous groups of people (most of whom were Polish Catholic peasants) and, in the absence of the Partitions, a movement from East to

West would have witnessed a smooth gradient of cultural characteristics across the country. Thus, I assume that pre-Partition conditions do not drive contemporary differences at the border.

Due to low social mobility of the general population in the early nineteenth century, individuals could not freely choose their partition. In fact, inter-partition mobility seems to have remained low even after the partitions— in 65% to 75% cases, *all* ancestors up to great-grandfathers lived in the same partition as the respondent. Even though cultural and economic movement across the borders took place throughout the partitions period (with different intensities), the borders caused a clear discontinuity in exposure to both institutions and culture, as discussed in section 5.

I further argue that the potential economically significant cultural differences persist regardless of *contemporary* socioeconomic disparities. Although it is not possible to separate them hermetically, I apply weights on sex, age, income, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality to balance the structures of respondent groups representing each partition (with Stata's *ebalance* command, which utilizes maximum entropy reweighting scheme from Hainmueller, 2012). I cannot hold constant physical capital in the form of the farm structures and sizes or architectural features of buildings built during each partition, which Wysokińska (2017) cites as potential channels responsible for income disparity. However, the physical capital does not seem to impact cultural differences other than through income differences, which I account for.

Finally, there are limitations to reliance on data collected from a panel of online respondents. One problem is representativeness. As discussed in subsection 7.4, the demographic structure of my individual-level dataset overrepresents women, young people, and probably also the more highly educated, non-urbanized, and unemployed. An overrepresentation by young people may lead to weaker differences if they smooth over time, everything else constant; and even weaker differences, modern progress assumed.

Selection bias is another potential threat. Online survey takers are more open about sharing personal information (in general and online in particular) and are more comfortable with the internet. This, intuitively, could be less common in the less advanced post-Russian part, and thus the subset of people more similar to the post-Prussian group may be more likely to participate. Moreover, for both groups, it is possible that using the internet by older generations more correlates with higher literacy lower connectedness to traditional regional mentality. Finally, there remain issues with data quality: not all draws from the online panels were simple random samples with respect to sex and age, as discussed in section A.3 of the Appendix. However, this should not translate into a large bias after the application of weights on demographics (sex, age, education, urbanization, income, unemployment).

9. RESULTS

9.1. Preliminary Results

In a preliminary analysis, I perform two-sample t-tests for equal means on raw differences in outcomes between the former partitions in the whole sample. As Table 2 reports, only two outcomes are statistically significant in this setting: the belief in the practical importance of hard work is larger in the post-Prussian part, while the belief in the existence of hell is stronger in the post-Russian part. Taken together, this reminds of a society that has undergone the secularization of the Protestant work ethic, a plausible outcome in what used to be Prussia. However, the main results do not confirm these findings.

9.2. Main Results

9.2.1. Overview

Tables 3.1-3.3 present the main results of the paper, which utilize OLS regression models with probability weights on demographics.¹⁶ The progression of rows in these tables tracks how outcomes change when narrowing down the study area from 60 to 15 kilometers in each direction from the 1815 border. It appears that the broadest bandwidth captures broader regional differences, plausibly related to the proximity to Western Europe, whereas the narrowest bandwidth crystallizes inter-partition disparities (despite a 4-time sample size reduction).

Assuming that the narrowest bandwidths give the most credible results, the rest of subsection 9.2 presents statistical evidence that Poles in the Prussian partition became more frequent and more active members of social organizations, less altruistic, less trusting toward Germans relative to Russians, and more confident in schools, police, and courts (relatively to the Russian partition). However, I find little statistical evidence for persistent disparities in personal economic preferences, religious beliefs, generalized trust, outlook on the poor, or adherence to the rule of law—possibly due to the use of just 682 observations. These results seem robust to dropping weights on demographics and to survey-company fixed effects. They are also stronger than placebo outcomes. Section A.1 of the Appendix discusses these tests in detail.

9.2.2. Personal Preferences

Table 3.1 presents the effects of living in the post-Prussian part of Poland on personal preferences. When using the full sample, the Prussian treatment seems to have decreased church

¹⁶ In particular, variables for female, age, education, income, unemployment, and urbanization.

attendance and beliefs in the importance of organization and discipline for success, in the moral value of hard work, and in the existence of hell. These effects remain even after the exclusion of large cities (Table A-2.2 in the Appendix). However, none of these results retains any conventional significance with a bandwidth narrower than 60 km. Thus, there is no evidence for the persistence of differences in personal preferences.

9.2.3. Prosocial Preferences

In contrast, there is evidence for persistent differences in prosocial preferences between the partitions (Table 3.2). Within 15 kilometers to the border, there are relatively strong and significant positive effects on both membership and activity in social organizations (consistent with the hypothesis). Moreover, these effects seem to gradually emerge when narrowing the bandwidth. Similarly, the coefficient on altruism becomes large and negative closer to the border, while on negative reciprocity—large and positive. Although altruism is weakly significant, while negative reciprocity is not significant, together these indicators may suggest a relative reduction of prosocial behavior under Prussia. This would mean that crossing the border westward seems to increase social capital despite decreasing cooperative attitudes.

9.2.4. Trust

Table 3.3 focuses on trust measures. Whereas generalized trust is unaffected, Prussian occupation seems to have altered Poles' views on Germans and on institutions. Although post-Prussian Poles trust Germans more than Russians in the full sample, the effect changes signs, increases, and becomes 10%-significant when restricted to 15 kilometers. The positive impact of the Prussian treatment on institutional trust grows with bandwidth reduction (without significance). Extracting schools, police, and courts adds a 10%-significance to this result. The coefficient on the

objectivity of school gradually changes to positive with bandwidth reduction (without significance). Considered together, these statistically weak results suggest that the Prussian rule may have left a legacy of relative distrust toward the Germans but also of confidence in institutions. This is consistent with the historical picture of a law-abiding but colonizing Prussian state.

9.3. Ancestry

Traits learned at home can be different from those acquired at school or workplace. How do outcomes differ when the analysis stresses vertical transmission? To address this question, regression models in this subsection replace a single binary partition indicator with two binary variables based on the ancestry of the respondent: an indicator for all ancestors reported exclusively from post-Prussian municipalities and an indicator for ancestors reported from both types of municipalities. (Respondents with all ancestors reported exclusively from post-Russian municipalities constitute the baseline).¹⁷ I use the bandwidth of 30 km to address a too small sample (resulting from ancestry questions being optional and frequently skipped by respondents). However, I check the 15-kilometer bandwidth, reported in Table A-3.1, and see similar results at weaker significance levels.

Table 4 shows the effect of exclusively Prussian ancestry and mixed ancestry on all outcomes. Overall, these indicators provide little evidence for the vertical transmission of economic preferences, except for involvement in social organizations.¹⁸ Personal preferences do not show a clear pattern.¹⁹ As far as prosocial preferences are concerned, the effect is clear on organizations

¹⁷ While this setup emphasizes a strictly vertical transmission, it does not isolate it. On the one hand, as measures of the Prussian treatment, these regressors give more weight to respondents with post-Prussian Polish ancestors (and less weight to post-Russian Polish ancestors) regardless of the respondent location. On the other hand, a respondent's ancestor from a post-Prussian municipality could have acquired "Prussian" traits not only from his parents, but also from his peers.

¹⁸ The p-value of the F-test of this regression: 0.03.

¹⁹ Although there is a significant negative effect of mixed ancestry on organization and discipline and economic traits in children, it does not seem to carry a meaning, as strictly post-Prussian Polish ancestry does not confirm it.

(significant and large on both indicators) but ambiguous on altruism and negative reciprocity. Outcomes on institutional trust are small and insignificant (although have the same signs as in Table 3.3). In summary, vertical transmission of the effects of Partitions seems to be relatively weak on its own, considering the relatively large sample size. Nonetheless, this analysis confirms Prussia's positive effect on contemporary involvement in social organizations. Table A-3.2 restricts ancestry to great-grandfathers and corroborates these findings.

9.4 Heterogeneity

Have the Partitions affected some groups more strongly than others? Are any effects opposite? This subsection explores the subset of the main outcomes for which heterogeneity seems the most manifest: activity in organizations, altruism, trust toward Russians relatively more than Germans, trust in schools, police, and courts, and the perception of school as an objective source of knowledge. In Table 5, each of these outcomes has a corresponding column, while each of the demographic categories has a corresponding row. The last column reports the size of each demographic group. While small (between 326 and 371 observations), these groups are similar in size relative to each other. Although no control variables enter these regressions, demographic weights to hold the demographics constant across the post-Prussian and post-Russian samples.²⁰

9.4.1. Heterogeneity by Group

There does not seem to be a pattern highlighting any particular age, urbanization, or income group. This is a particularly interesting result in the case of age (Table A-4 in the appendix confirms

²⁰ My baseline has weights on female, age, income, unemployment, education, and urbanization. For heterogeneity regressions, I recalculate the weights for each demographic category so as to exclude the variable that divide the sample. For example, sex-based heterogeneity has weights on age, income, unemployment, education, and urbanization, but not on female.

it for all variables), because people below 40 were raised not only more time after the Partitions, but also in a more mobile, West-oriented, and otherwise culturally dynamic Poland after the collapse of Communism. Another fact to highlight is that more educated respondents exhibit larger and more significant outcomes consistently across the variables in Table 5. Considering that more educated may have larger social networks, this suggests oblique or horizontal transmission as the source of persistence.

9.4.2. Heterogeneity by Outcome

Higher activity in organizations in former Prussia is statistically significantly associated with an above-median age, post-secondary education, living in a rural municipality, and an above-median income. Except for the lower educated, the remaining demographic groups also exhibit higher social activity in former Prussia, although with no statistical significance. Lower altruism in former Prussia is statistically explained by higher education and living in an urban area. The negative effect of the Prussian partition on relative trust toward Germans is the most prevalent among younger, poorer, and more urbanized groups. Schools, police, and courts have a better reputation in former Prussia among people with above-median income.

9.5. Discussion

9.5.1. Interpretation

The most consistent finding across all specifications is that Prussian Poland's tradition of membership and activity in social organizations has persisted to the present. This implies higher levels of social capital in Prussian Poland, as pointed out in historical and sociological literature but hitherto not demonstrated empirically. This effect is strong especially among the older generation, those with higher education, those with above-median income, and those living in rural areas. The

stronger effect on rural areas seems to follow from the strong culture of agricultural societies that emerged under Partitions, as mentioned in subsection 5.7.

No significant impact on personal preferences seems surprising. The narrative about the thrifty, frugal, disciplined, and hard-working Prussian Pole seems to be a matter of the past, even among the older subsample (Table A-4). However, the non-significant positive effects on religiosity could be confirmed with more statistical power. Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya's (2014) use of alternative sources delivers outcomes that are consistent with mine and statistically significant.

Although most results regarding prosocial preferences and trust go against my hypotheses, they are not entirely unexpected. Colonizing Prussian Poland with German settlers (unparalleled in the Russian Kingdom of Poland) might have generated an atmosphere of conflict and rivalry. This would suggest a higher social mobilization there, which could have persisted in the form of the elevated level of social capital. This would also explain why Prussian occupation seems to have increased relative distrust toward Germans, decreased altruism, and possibly increased negative reciprocity. Lower levels of altruism are consistent with stereotypes (Holzer et al., 1980).

In turn, the reputation of Prussian institutions seems to have persistently increased institutional trust, and the enlightened model of the Prussian school seems to explain the stronger belief in the objectivity of curriculum. The evidence is statistically weak for these institutional variables in the overall. However, it gains statistical significance in rural municipalities—possibly due to a disproportionately more universal access to schooling in the former Prussian part (subsection 5.3) Moreover, the group with higher income exhibits these beliefs outstandingly strongly. Although this could suggest that more confidence in schools leads to more education and thus to higher

incomes, Bukowski (2018) does not find evidence for higher scores in post-Prussian schools. Future research could attempt to resolve this puzzle.

Finally, it is interesting that ancestry predicts the outcomes more weakly than a respondent's location. This lightly suggests that, about four generations after the end of the Partitions, family transmission plays a lesser role than location in passing the "Prussian" traits.²¹ Moreover, stronger effects among the more highly educated could point to the importance of oblique and horizontal transmission.

9.5.2. Implications

Considering that institutions are not plausible channels of persistence on the one hand (subsection 6.2), and that my analysis does not find evidence for many cultural disparities on the other hand, there remain few possible explanations of the political and economic disparities found in literature (and reported as t-tests in Table 1.1). Table A-5.1 of the Appendix suggests that higher urbanization does not explain higher incomes in former Prussia. Although this is consistent with Wysokińska's (2017) findings that rural areas drive the disparity, I cannot confirm the author's assertion that this results from larger farm sizes, as farms do not affect my results.²²

An alternative explanation could be a higher level of social capital in former Prussia found in this paper. Literature suggests a positive impact of social capital on economic growth (e.g. Andini, 2019), and there is a large and statistically significant positive correlation between activity in organizations and income in both partitions of my sample (Table A-5.1). However, despite a strong

²¹ The median respondent is the fourth generation born after the end of the Partitions (assuming that generations are 20 years apart, the great-grandparents of the median respondent were born around 1918).

²² The above-median-income Prussian subsample represents 24 different professions, with just one farmer and one company owner.

and significant impact of the Partitions on social activity in rural areas (Table 5), this activity is insufficient to explain higher incomes (Table A-5.2). Considering that the source of the cross-border income disparity seems to be located in rural areas, and that there is yet not enough evidence to indicate either farm structures or social activity as a cause, future research could focus on these two potential explanations.

As this paper has presented strong evidence against persistent differences in personal economic preferences, my findings may justify public investments to increase capital in the former Russian partition. Although the types of capital responsible for higher incomes in former Prussia remain only weakly identified, it seems that policies targeted at improving agricultural conditions and forming social networks could enhance the standard of living eastward from the relict border. In turn, some organized promotion of altruistic behavior could benefit former Prussian Poland.

However, as discussed in subsection 8.2, the findings of this paper face limitations. The results may be underestimated due to the reliance on short survey questions, online interviews, an overrepresentation of certain demographic groups (in particular, female, younger, more educated), and municipality-level partition assignments. Future studies could further explore locality-level ancestry data of *Partitions of Poland Survey* for more precise estimates, collect a larger sample from the narrowest bandwidth, or use an alternative methodology.

10. CONCLUSION

The authors of a study in the cross-border municipality Golub-Dobrzyń (Holzer et al., 1980; described in subsection 6.3) conjecture that the cultural differences between the partitions will soon fade away. However, four decades later, the *Partitions of Poland Survey* documents the persistence of small differences on a limited number of indicators. Several specifications confirm a stronger

tradition of social activity in former Prussia, which some historians consider to be a legacy of the 19th-century German-Polish cultural rivalry. There is also some evidence for higher institutional trust, lower altruism, and more negative attitude toward Germans in this partition. Historical facts in favor of the exogeneity of inter-partition borders strongly suggest a causal interpretation of these results. Future research could investigate the relationship between income and social capital across the partitions in rural Poland.

MAPS AND TABLES

Map 1: Poland after the Congress of Vienna (1815)


The Duchy of Poznań is marked dark blue; the Kingdom of Poland is marked light red. The green line is the border under investigation.




Source: Witold Sienkiewicz, Elżbieta Owczak, Marzena Wierczorek. *Wielki Atlas Historii Polski*. Page 283. Demart S.A. Warszawa 2018

Map 2: Study Area

The study area stretches 60 km from the 1815 Prussian-Russian border. The formerly Prussian municipalities are marked blue, while the formerly Russian municipalities are marked green. All municipalities had belonged to the Prussian partition before 1815.




Map 3.1: Partitions of Poland Survey Coverage



The *Partitions of Poland Survey* covers most of the study area. Municipalities with at least one respondent are marked green, while municipalities with no respondents are marked blue.

Map 3.2: Partitions of Poland Survey Coverage



This choropleth presents the number of respondents per municipality.

Table 1.1: Municipality-Level Summary Statistics and T-Tests

	Russian Par.		Prussian Par.		diff Pr. - Ru.	p-value
	mean	sd	mean	sd		
female share in 15+ population, CSO	0.507	0.0110	0.510	0.0115	0.002*	0.04
nonadult (age below 20) share, CSO	0.0575	0.00826	0.0593	0.00802	0.002*	0.04
younger adult (age 20-39) share, CSO	0.323	0.0193	0.332	0.0207	0.009**	0.00
middle-aged (age 40-59) share, CSO	0.306	0.0131	0.312	0.0156	0.006**	0.00
old adult (age over 79) share, CSO	0.0952	0.0159	0.0814	0.0170	-0.014**	0.00
older adult (age 60-79) share, CSO	0.218	0.0222	0.216	0.0215	-0.003	0.21
rural share in population, 2011 Census	0.828	0.316	0.717	0.348	-0.111**	0.00
share of hh's with agricultural activity, 2010 Agricultural Census	0.899	0.100	0.865	0.141	-0.034**	0.01
population per 1 km ² , CSO	168.6	348.1	241.0	500.3	72.379	0.11
net migration per 1000 population, CSO	-2.550	5.388	-0.0358	8.266	2.514**	0.00
the share of the registered unemployed in the working-age population, CSO	5.165	2.755	3.668	2.010	-1.498**	0.00
Share of people with higher education, only for 2002.	4.634	2.429	5.768	3.242	1.134**	0.00
municipality's average farm size, 2010 Agricultural Census	7,755	3,404	8,914	5,670	1159.62*	0.02
municipality's personal income tax revenue per capita, CSO	672.4	245.2	869.8	400.1	197.331**	0.00
municipality's total revenue per capita, CSO	1,830	613.0	2,200	710.0	370.353**	0.00
Municipality-average (1950-2000) annual precipitation in mm.	541.6	23.03	555.8	32.80	14.118**	0.00
Municipality-average (1950-2000) annual temperature in Celcius degrees.	8.080	0.429	7.916	0.417	-0.163**	0.00
Municipality-average of altitude in meters.	125.4	38.27	118.1	44.86	-7.335+	0.09
Duda's share in total counted votes, 2020 Presidential El., 2nd round, PKW	0.669	0.0878	0.529	0.102	-0.140**	0.00
Civic Coalition (KO) share in total counted votes, 2019 Sejm (Lower House) El.,	0.128	0.0576	0.236	0.0890	0.108**	0.00
Turnout, 2018 Voivodeship Sejmik (Provincial Assembly) El., PKW	0.573	0.0553	0.536	0.0572	-0.037**	0.00
Turnout, 2019 Sejm (Lower House) El., PKW	0.547	0.0479	0.554	0.0718	0.008	0.22
Turnout, 2020 Presidential El., 2nd round, PKW	0.647	0.0358	0.629	0.0731	-0.019**	0.00

Note: Only municipalities covered by *Partitions of Poland Survey* included. All values are for 2019, unless otherwise specified.

Data sources: Central Statistical Office of Poland; Polish National Electoral Commission; Bukowski (2018).

Table 1.2: Individual-Level Summary Statistics and T-Tests

	Russian Par.		Prussian Par.		diff Pr. - Ru.	p-value
	mean	sd	mean	sd		
female	0.669	0.471	0.658	0.475	-0.012	0.49
nonadult (age below 20)	0.0564	0.231	0.0406	0.198	-0.016*	0.04
younger adult (age 20-39)	0.495	0.500	0.435	0.496	-0.060**	0.00
middle-aged (age 40-59)	0.363	0.481	0.393	0.489	0.031+	0.08
older adult (age 60-79)	0.0856	0.280	0.129	0.335	0.043**	0.00
old adult (age over 79)	0	0	0.00185	0.0430	0.002+	0.10
rural	0.488	0.500	0.396	0.489	-0.092**	0.00
post-secondary edu.	0.502	0.500	0.525	0.500	0.022	0.22
unemployed	0.0765	0.266	0.0616	0.240	-0.015+	0.10
income	5,060	10,976	5,152	11,099	91.540	0.82
working hours	23.48	20.31	24.29	19.82	0.805	0.27
distance to the Prussian-Russian border, in km, centered at the border.	27.60	16.72	-38.39	18.45	-65.989**	0.00
ancestors from Prussian partition only	0.0506	0.219	0.652	0.476	0.601**	0.00
ancestors from Russian partition only	0.744	0.437	0.0944	0.293	-0.650**	0.00

Note: The values reflect the structure of the 2021 *Partitions of Poland Survey* after dropping observations with interview lengths below 5 minutes.

Table 2: Partitions and Cultural Outcomes, Two-Sample T-Tests

	Russian Par.		Prussian Par.		diff Pr. -Ru.	p-value
	mean	sd	mean	sd		
patience	6.948	1.918	6.893	1.880	-0.05	0.50
risk-taking	5.769	2.262	5.710	2.173	-0.06	0.54
credit taking	4.325	2.783	4.465	2.795	0.14	0.24
discipline	7.392	1.971	7.296	1.900	-0.10	0.25
moral val. of work	5.758	2.490	5.662	2.381	-0.10	0.36
practical val. of work	4.896	2.476	5.143	2.421	0.25*	0.02
economic behavior in children	0.248	0.169	0.244	0.164	0.00	0.64
church attendance	3.747	1.885	3.674	1.949	-0.07	0.37
belief in hell	5.710	3.152	5.376	3.127	-0.33*	0.01
org. membership	0.786	1.225	0.752	1.174	-0.03	0.51
org. activity	0.592	0.992	0.567	0.938	-0.03	0.55
altruism	7.478	2.207	7.516	2.113	0.04	0.68
neg. reciprocity	5.141	2.411	5.054	2.394	-0.09	0.40
tax cheating	3.191	2.818	3.102	2.856	-0.09	0.47
bribery	2.718	2.676	2.610	2.763	-0.11	0.36
society unfair	5.573	2.335	5.596	2.163	0.02	0.81
gen. trust	5.656	2.186	5.758	2.156	0.10	0.28
trust Russians more than Germans	4.208	2.011	4.132	1.985	-0.08	0.38
institutional trust	1.198	1.455	1.271	1.511	0.07	0.25
school as objective	6.155	2.300	6.254	2.188	0.10	0.31

Note: The values come from the 2021 *Partitions of Poland Survey* after dropping observations with interview lengths below 5 minutes.

Table 3.1: Partitions and Personal Preferences

	patience	risk-taking	credit-taking	organization and discipline	moral value of work	practical value of work	economic traits in children	church attendance	belief in hell
Indicator for Prussian Partition; 60-km bandwidth	-0.088 (0.071)	-0.096 (0.084)	-0.116 (0.104)	-0.183** (0.071)	-0.175+ (0.092)	-0.005 (0.090)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.154* (0.073)	-0.265* (0.119)
Indicator for Prussian Partition; 45-km bandwidth	0.035 (0.090)	0.031 (0.104)	0.066 (0.133)	-0.107 (0.090)	-0.058 (0.117)	0.120 (0.114)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.091 (0.093)	-0.204 (0.151)
Indicator for Prussian Partition; 30-km bandwidth	0.094 (0.111)	0.060 (0.127)	0.075 (0.159)	-0.044 (0.110)	-0.046 (0.141)	0.218 (0.140)	0.000 (0.010)	-0.050 (0.115)	-0.167 (0.185)
Indicator for Prussian Partition; 15-km bandwidth	-0.024 (0.156)	-0.125 (0.179)	-0.121 (0.213)	-0.190 (0.148)	-0.086 (0.189)	0.103 (0.193)	0.012 (0.014)	0.034 (0.159)	0.111 (0.255)

Note: The table reports coefficients on a binary indicator for the former Prussian partition in OLS regressions. Each regression's sample is limited to the indicated number of kilometers in each direction from the 1815 Prussian-Russian border. Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients. Separately for each regression, probability weights on sex, age, income, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. The numbers of observations are 2987, 1934, 1259, 682, respectively. Data: *Partitions of Poland Survey*. Statistical significance: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.2: Partitions and Prosocial Preferences

	membership in organizations	activity in organizations	altruism	negative reciprocity	tax cheating justified	bribery justified	society unfair toward poor
Indicator for Prussian Partition; 60-km bandwidth	-0.013 (0.043)	-0.017 (0.035)	0.003 (0.081)	-0.092 (0.089)	-0.017 (0.105)	-0.038 (0.100)	-0.067 (0.082)
Indicator for Prussian Partition; 45-km bandwidth	0.044 (0.054)	0.026 (0.045)	-0.002 (0.103)	0.003 (0.114)	0.024 (0.134)	-0.026 (0.128)	-0.026 (0.106)
Indicator for Prussian Partition; 30-km bandwidth	0.123+ (0.070)	0.093 (0.058)	0.030 (0.124)	0.216 (0.135)	-0.055 (0.163)	-0.042 (0.154)	-0.007 (0.128)
Indicator for Prussian Partition; 15-km bandwidth	0.310** (0.095)	0.216** (0.077)	-0.288+ (0.174)	0.212 (0.190)	0.208 (0.227)	0.180 (0.213)	-0.044 (0.177)

Note: The table reports coefficients on a binary indicator for the former Prussian partition in OLS regressions. Each regression's sample is limited to the indicated number of kilometers in each direction from the 1815 Prussian-Russian border. Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients. Separately for each regression, probability weights on sex, age, income, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. The numbers of observations are 2987, 1934, 1259, 682, respectively. Data: *Partitions of Poland Survey*. Statistical significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3.3: Partitions and Trust

	generalized trust	trust Russians more than Germans	institutional trust	trust in schools, police, and courts	perception of school as objective
Indicator for Prussian Partition; 60-km bandwidth	-0.089 (0.082)	-0.168* (0.075)	0.040 (0.057)	-0.027 (0.031)	-0.182* (0.084)
Indicator for Prussian Partition; 45-km bandwidth	0.040 (0.104)	-0.015 (0.092)	0.083 (0.072)	0.025 (0.040)	0.031 (0.105)
Indicator for Prussian Partition; 30-km bandwidth	-0.042 (0.125)	0.125 (0.114)	0.065 (0.089)	0.015 (0.049)	0.162 (0.131)
Indicator for Prussian Partition; 15-km bandwidth	-0.037 (0.175)	0.297+ (0.154)	0.141 (0.118)	0.119+ (0.069)	0.234 (0.185)

Note: The table reports coefficients on a binary indicator for the former Prussian partition in OLS regressions. Each regression's sample is limited to the indicated number of kilometers in each direction from the 1815 Prussian-Russian border. Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients. Separately for each regression, probability weights on sex, age, income, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. The numbers of observations are 2987, 1934, 1259, 682, respectively. Data: *Partitions of Poland Survey*. Statistical significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 4: Partitions and Cultural Outcomes, Ancestry (bandwidth of 30 km)

Prussian only	mixed	Prussian only	mixed	Prussian only	mixed	Prussian only	mixed	Prussian only	mixed
patience		risk-taking		credit-taking		organization and discipline		moral value of hard work	
-0.131 (0.132)	-0.103 (0.144)	-0.000 (0.150)	0.064 (0.161)	-0.048 (0.192)	0.183 (0.196)	-0.057 (0.135)	-0.297* (0.140)	-0.153 (0.172)	-0.169 (0.176)
practical value of hard work		economic traits in children		church attendance		belief in hell		membership in organizations	
0.036 (0.166)	0.170 (0.177)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.027* (0.013)	0.234+ (0.140)	-0.028 (0.143)	0.221 (0.218)	0.177 (0.232)	0.160+ (0.090)	0.058 (0.080)
activity in organizations		altruism		negative reciprocity		tax cheating justified		bribery justified	
0.137* (0.069)	0.159* (0.068)	-0.044 (0.149)	0.166 (0.158)	0.066 (0.162)	-0.040 (0.176)	-0.066 (0.199)	-0.381+ (0.202)	-0.254 (0.184)	-0.182 (0.200)
society unfair toward poor		generalized trust		trust Russians more than Germans		institutional trust		perception of schools as objective	
0.231 (0.154)	0.215 (0.168)	-0.231 (0.150)	0.169 (0.158)	-0.049 (0.132)	-0.176 (0.149)	0.045 (0.101)	0.166 (0.106)	0.098 (0.159)	0.026 (0.163)

Note: Individual-level data from the *Partitions of Poland Survey* limited to the bandwidth of 30 km in each direction from the historical Prussian-Russian border. The table reports coefficients in OLS regressions on two indicators of ancestry: *Prussian only* indicates that all reported ancestors lived in municipalities of the former Prussian partition; *mixed* indicates ancestors from both partitions; the baseline is the group of respondents with all reported ancestors from municipalities of the former Russian partition. Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients. Probability weights on sex, age, income, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. Number of observations: 1211. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 5: Partitions and Cultural Outcomes, Heterogeneity

activity in organizations		altruism		trust Russians more than Germans		trust in schools, police, and courts		perception of school as objective		observations	
Age ≤ 39	Age > 39	Age ≤ 39	Age > 39	Age ≤ 39	Age > 39	Age ≤ 39	Age > 39	Age ≤ 39	Age > 39	Age ≤ 39	Age > 39
0.146	0.289**	-0.234	-0.269	0.449*	0.127	0.192+	0.051	0.225	0.223	345	330
<i>(0.120)</i>	<i>(0.096)</i>	<i>(0.265)</i>	<i>(0.234)</i>	<i>(0.210)</i>	<i>(0.222)</i>	<i>(0.108)</i>	<i>(0.090)</i>	<i>(0.281)</i>	<i>(0.244)</i>		
Without higher education	With higher education	Without higher education	With higher education	Without higher education	With higher education	Without higher education	With higher education	Without higher education	With higher education	Without higher education	With higher education
-0.023	0.418**	0.049	-0.585*	0.266	0.321	0.079	0.157	0.045	0.402	337	345
<i>(0.105)</i>	<i>(0.111)</i>	<i>(0.258)</i>	<i>(0.235)</i>	<i>(0.221)</i>	<i>(0.215)</i>	<i>(0.099)</i>	<i>(0.095)</i>	<i>(0.263)</i>	<i>(0.256)</i>		
Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
0.125	0.326**	-0.536*	0.012	0.365+	0.213	0.155+	0.077	-0.050	0.574*	356	326
<i>(0.106)</i>	<i>(0.112)</i>	<i>(0.250)</i>	<i>(0.238)</i>	<i>(0.210)</i>	<i>(0.226)</i>	<i>(0.093)</i>	<i>(0.101)</i>	<i>(0.259)</i>	<i>(0.260)</i>		
Income ≤ 2500 zł	Income > 2500 zł	Income ≤ 2500 zł	Income > 2500 zł	Income ≤ 2500 zł	Income > 2500 zł	Income ≤ 2500 zł	Income > 2500 zł	Income ≤ 2500 zł	Income > 2500 zł	Income ≤ 2500 zł	Income > 2500 zł
0.149	0.298**	-0.218	-0.280	0.439*	0.236	-0.061	0.311**	-0.485+	1.102**	371	331
<i>(0.108)</i>	<i>(0.105)</i>	<i>(0.241)</i>	<i>(0.251)</i>	<i>(0.204)</i>	<i>(0.227)</i>	<i>(0.092)</i>	<i>(0.100)</i>	<i>(0.250)</i>	<i>(0.255)</i>		

Note: Individual-level data from the *Partitions of Poland Survey* limited to the bandwidth of 15 km in each direction from the historical Prussian-Russian border. The table reports coefficients on a binary indicator for the former Prussian partition in OLS regressions according to formula (1). Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients (in italics). Probability weights on sex, age, income, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality (with one of these variables skipped if it is the outcome in a given regression) are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. The last column lists number of observations for each heterogeneity group. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

APPENDIX

A.1. Robustness Checks and Placebo Test

These main results seem to be consistent across changes in weights and control variables and to exhibit a stronger pattern of magnitudes and statistical significance than placebo tests. My robustness checks involve the use of an unweighted sample, the inclusion of survey-company fixed effects (both in Table A-2.1), the exclusion of large cities (Table A-2.2). My placebo test randomly assigns a partition to each respondent (Table A-2.3).

As Table A-2.1 reports, the results described for the 15-kilometer bandwidth are robust to the use of an unweighted sample as well as to the inclusion of survey-company fixed effects. In fact, higher trust in Russians than in Germans becomes significant at the 5% level and grows in magnitude in both cases. Coefficients on membership and activity in organizations remain large and significant. The outcomes on altruism, negative reciprocity, and the three institutional trust measures retain their signs and magnitudes.

Table A-2.2 shows the results after excluding cities with more than 100 thousand citizens. The effects within the 60-kilometer bandwidth remain roughly the same with slight significance reduction attributable to a smaller sample size. In turn, the subsample of the 15-kilometer bandwidth, which only excludes the city of Toruń, also broadly confirms the main results (in particular with regards to membership and activity in organizations, and less so in the case of altruism). The large and significant coefficient on tax cheating does not seem reliable, as it does not emerge gradually with a bandwidth increase and is countered with weakly negative coefficients in Table 4. Finally, the placebo test in Table A-2.3 randomly assigns a partition within the 15-kilometer bandwidth. Overall,

it shows smaller magnitudes and more scant significance than the main results, which lends credence to the latter.

A.2. Key Historical Dates

- 1772: The First Partition of Poland takes place.
- 1793: The Second Partition of Poland takes place.
- 1795: The Third Partition of Poland takes place.
- 1807: The Duchy of Warsaw emerges.
- 1815: Congress of Vienna; Duchy of Warsaw ceases to exist; the Kingdom of Poland emerges under the Russian Empire, and the Duchy of Posen emerges under the Kingdom of Prussia.
- 1830: The November Uprising breaks out in the Kingdom of Poland.
- 1832: The Kingdom of Poland is incorporated into Russia.
- 1848: The Duchy of Posen is incorporated into Prussia.
- 1863: January Uprising is insurrected in the Russian Partition.
- 1918: Independent Second Republic of Poland emerges in the aftermath of World War II.

A.3. Survey Realization Details

Although online surveys tend to overrepresent younger population, they allow substantially larger sample sizes due to lower costs compared to telephone surveys. I decided in favor of the former and ordered the survey's realization from two independent companies, which drew respondents from their existing online panels. They conducted the interviews between January 13th

and February 4th, 2021, and provided me with 1233 and 1920 observations, respectively. The average interview length was 24 minutes and 45 seconds, while the median was 10 minutes and 40 seconds.

For both companies, the implementation of online survey forms was based on the same written questionnaire and featured the same order, stacking, and wording of questions, scales, and ways of coding. There were small differences in presenting advance comments to questions (whether on separate pages or on the same pages as questions), inputting ancestry questions (how much typing was required) and the graphics of the visual layout.

Despite highest efforts to ensure the quality and uniformity of data across survey firms, there emerged issues related to the ways samples were drawn and as to which questions were mandatory. The first difference pertains to age. The first survey firm focused on respondents aged 35 or higher (with the exception of 50 male individuals of ages between 25 and 35). The second survey company drew a simple random sample with respect to age, and thus included respondents of all age groups above 18 (in addition to 25 individuals below this threshold).

The second difference is related to sex. For the former Russian partition, both survey firms drew the maximal numbers of respondents available in their nationwide panels. For the former Prussian partition, however, the first survey firm made efforts achieve a sex balance, which resulted in the sex ratio of 1.42:1, while the second survey firm drew a simple random sample with respect to sex, which resulted in the sex ratio of 2.41:1. These sex ratio and age ratio imbalances resulted from initial efforts to partially reduce a bias toward female individuals and individuals of younger age groups, which is present in the panels of respondents of both online survey companies. I account for these imbalances in the section 9 by applying weights on demographics.

The differences in the optionality of questions are as follows. For the first 494 respondents from the first survey company, the questions about the localities where the respondent and each of

his or her parents lived until turning 18 were mandatory; for the other 739, they were optional. For the 1920 respondents from the second survey company, the question about the respondent's locality was mandatory, but the questions about parents' locations were optional. These differences affect the quality of my data, although not the interpretation of my results.

A.4. Available Data Sources for Future Research

The existing empirical literature has vastly exploited the publicly available local data from the regions of interest by drawing county-level data from the Social Diagnosis; municipality-level data from Polish National Electoral Commission, the Central Examination Board, the Institute of Statistics of the Polish Catholic Church, and annual statistical reports by municipalities; and sampling-unit data from the Life in Transition Survey. These sources include election outcomes and measures of generalized trust, institutional trust, religious belief, religious attendance, employment, income, education level, among others.

Potential new sources of socio-economic variables are Google Mobility Trends (county-level data on physical movement), the Study of Human Capital in Poland (municipality-level data on qualifications, professional experience, and attitudes toward work). Household Budget Survey, Labor Force Survey, and Statistics on Income and Living Conditions provide rich county-level microdata on labor, employment, household expenditures, and other areas, but access is restricted, and freely accessible data are limited to aggregates reported in charts.

A.5. Additional Tables and Figures

Table A-1: Survey Questions, Sources, and Variables

Indicator name	Question	Answers	Source
	How well does each of the following statements describe you as a person?		
<i>generalized trust</i>	I assume that people have only the best intentions.	1 to 10	GPS 2018, WP13424R
<i>patience</i>	I am willing to give up something that is beneficial for me today in order to benefit more from that in the future.	1 to 10	GPS 2018, WP13418R
<i>negative reciprocity</i>	If I am treated very unfairly, I take revenge at the first opportunity, even if there may be costs to me.	1 to 10	GPS 2018, WP13419R
<i>cognitive</i>	I am good at math.	1 to 10	GPS 2018, WP13425R
	How willing are you to take the following actions?	1 to 10	
<i>altruism</i>	How willing are you to give to good causes without expecting anything in return?	1 to 10	GPS 2018, WP13421R
<i>credit taking</i>	If you need money, how willing are you to take credit?		
<i>risk-taking</i>	How willing are you to take risks?	1 to 10	GPS 2018, WP13417
<i>economic behavior in children</i>	Some people believe that children should learn different things at home. Please select the ones that are the most important in your opinion (no more than five).	good manners; politeness and neatness; independence; hard work; honesty; responsibility; patience; imagination; tolerance and respect to other people; leadership skills; self-control; thrift, saving money and things; determination, perseverance; religiosity, unselfishness, obedience, loyalty	WVS 2012, A027-A043
	Where on the scale would you indicate your opinion on the given statement?		
<i>moral value of hard work</i>	Hard work has a value even if it does not bring the desired effects.	1 to 10	Own
<i>organization and discipline</i>	Being organized and disciplined is necessary to succeed in life.	1 to 10	Own
<i>tax cheating justified</i>	Generally speaking, there are circumstances under which cheating on taxes can be justified.	1 to 10	WVS 2012, F116
<i>bribery justified</i>	Generally speaking, there are circumstances under which giving bribes can be justified.	1 to 10	WVS 2012, F117
	Which statement is closer to your opinion?	1 to 10	
<i>practical value of hard work</i>	Left: In the long run, hard work ascertains better life. Right: Hard work does not bring success. Success is rather a matter of luck and connections.	1 to 10	WVS 2012, E040
<i>perception of school as objective</i>	Left: School is mainly a tool of state indoctrination. Right: School is mainly an objective source of knowledge.	1 to 10	Own
<i>society unfair toward poor</i>	Left: People in need in our country are poor, because of their laziness and lack of strong will. Right: People in our country are poor, because the society is unfair.	1 to 10	WVS third wave (in Alesina and Giuliano, 2009)
<i>institutional trust; trust in schools, police, and courts</i>	Please select all institutions which you trust.	local government; state government; schools; commercial banks; police; courts; European Union; private media; public media; none of the above	Social Diagnosis 2015, 105
<i>trust Russians more than Germans</i>	As far as ordinary people are concerned, which nation do you trust more? Left: Germans; Right: Russians	1 to 10	Own

Table A-1: Survey Questions, Sources, and Variables (cont.)

Indicator name	Question	Answers	Source
<i>membership in organizations</i>	In total, to how many social organizations do you belong? (Examples presented to the respondent: church, religious, sport, recreational, art, music, educational, environmental, professional, humanitarian, charitable, consumer organizations; labor unions; political parties.)	0 to 10; more than 10	WVS, A064-A106
<i>activity in organizations</i>	In total, in how many organizations are you actively involved?	0 to 10; more than 10	WVS, A064-A107
<i>church attendance</i>	Apart from weddings, baptizms, and funerals, how often do you go to church?	7. More than once a week 6. Once a week 5. Once a month 4. Only on special holy days 3. Once a year 2. Less often 1. Never, practically never	WVS, F028
<i>belief in hell</i>	Do you believe in the existence of hell? Left: Definitely no. Right: Definitely yes.	1 to 10	WVS, F053
<i>education</i>	What is the highest educational level you have attained?	1. none 2. some elementary 3. elementary 4. basic vocational 5. some secondary (vocational) 6. complete secondary (vocational) 7. some secondary (high school) 8. complete secondary (high school) 9. post-secondary 10. some higher 11. complete higher	WVS, X025
<i>work hours</i>	Do you currently work? If yes, how many hours per week on average?	digit	WVS, X036
<i>current profession</i>	What job do you have? (Name of the main profession.)	a list of 48 options	WVS, X036
<i>past profession</i>	What job did you have in the past? (Name of the main profession).	a list of 48 options	WVS, X037
<i>income</i>	Considering the 12 months before the coronavirus pandemic, how much was the average monthly net salary per capita in your household? Please consider all income sources, including bonuses, prizes, revenues from additional, even irregular jobs, pensions, scholarships and all other revenues of all household members.	All numbers requested to be rounded up to 500 zł. For more than 99 999 zł, a separate box.	Ancestry Survey, D14
<i>respondent partition</i>	Please type the name of the locality in which you currently live and select it from the list.	TERYT code (locality id)	Own
	Please type the name of the locality in which you lived most of the time before turning 18.	TERYT code (locality id) or country name.	Own
<i>mother's partition</i>	Please type the name of the locality in which your MOTHER lived most of the time before turning 18. If you lived with a female guardian for longer than with you biological mother, please enter the locality of the female guardian.	TERYT code (locality id) or country name.	Own
<i>father's partition</i>	Please type the name of the locality in which your FATHER lived most of the time before turning 18. If you lived with a female guardian for longer than with you biological mother, please enter the locality of the female guardian.	TERYT code (locality id) or country name.	Own
<i>ancestor's partition</i>	Please type the name of the locality in which your GRAND-FATHER (father's father) lived for the most of his life.	TERYT code (locality id) or country name.	Own. Analogous questions were asked for the respondent's (both paternal and maternal) grandfather's father, grandmother, and grandmother's father.

Table A-2.1: Partitions and Cultural Outcomes, Robustness Checks

Personal preferences:	patience	risk-taking	credit-taking	organization and discipline	moral value of work	practical value of work	economic traits in children	church attendance	belief in hell
unweighted sample	0.021 (0.156)	-0.142 (0.177)	-0.182 (0.217)	-0.167 (0.147)	-0.117 (0.192)	0.105 (0.192)	0.012 (0.014)	0.046 (0.158)	0.112 (0.252)
control for company-fixed effects	0.028 (0.158)	-0.136 (0.180)	-0.280 (0.218)	-0.181 (0.148)	-0.131 (0.194)	0.129 (0.194)	0.013 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.159)	0.087 (0.254)
Prosocial preferences:	membership in organizations	activity in organizations	altruism	negative reciprocity	tax cheating justified	bribery justified	society unfair toward poor		
unweighted sample	0.279** (0.098)	0.196* (0.080)	-0.291+ (0.175)	0.265 (0.185)	0.256 (0.224)	0.247 (0.212)	-0.005 (0.176)		
control for company-fixed effects	0.237* (0.100)	0.164* (0.081)	-0.321+ (0.177)	0.287 (0.186)	0.314 (0.225)	0.262 (0.215)	0.005 (0.178)		
Trust:	generalized trust	trust Russians more than Germans	institutional trust	trust in schools, police, and courts	perception of school as objective				
unweighted sample	-0.057 (0.175)	0.326* (0.154)	0.128 (0.119)	0.108 (0.069)	0.161 (0.185)				
control for company-fixed effects	-0.088 (0.178)	0.381* (0.156)	0.107 (0.119)	0.111 (0.070)	0.124 (0.187)				

Note: Individual-level data from the *Partitions of Poland Survey* limited to the bandwidth of 15 km in each direction from the historical Prussian-Russian border. The table reports coefficients on a binary indicator for the former Prussian partition in OLS regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients. In regressions with company-fixed effects, probability weights on sex, age, income, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. The number of observations: 682. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table A-2.2: Partitions and Cultural Outcomes, Large Cities Excluded

Personal preferences:	patience	risk-taking	credit-taking	organization and discipline	moral value of work	practical value of work	economic traits in children	church attendance	belief in hell
60-km bandwidth	-0.061 (0.086)	0.029 (0.101)	0.143 (0.127)	-0.151+ (0.087)	-0.063 (0.111)	0.209+ (0.110)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.160+ (0.086)	-0.349* (0.143)
15-km bandwidth	-0.254 (0.195)	0.353 (0.214)	0.367 (0.274)	-0.215 (0.205)	0.296 (0.240)	-0.013 (0.245)	0.004 (0.018)	0.058 (0.207)	-0.169 (0.334)
Prosocial preferences:	membership in organizations	activity in organizations	altruism	negative reciprocity	tax cheating justified	bribery justified	society unfair toward poor		
60-km bandwidth	0.020 (0.052)	0.000 (0.042)	-0.014 (0.097)	-0.101 (0.110)	-0.000 (0.128)	-0.035 (0.121)	-0.074 (0.102)		
15-km bandwidth	0.467** (0.133)	0.297** (0.106)	-0.035 (0.225)	0.267 (0.256)	0.628* (0.288)	0.082 (0.284)	-0.103 (0.241)		
Trust:	generalized trust	trust Russians more than Germans	institutional trust	trust in schools, police, and courts	perception of school as objective				
60-km bandwidth	-0.032 (0.098)	-0.117 (0.090)	0.038 (0.067)	-0.017 (0.037)	-0.061 (0.101)				
15-km bandwidth	0.021 (0.240)	0.145 (0.204)	0.036 (0.154)	0.081 (0.093)	0.382 (0.234)				

Note: Individual-level data from the *Partitions of Poland Survey* limited to municipalities of below 100 thousand citizens. The table reports coefficients on a binary indicator for the former Prussian partition in OLS regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients. In regressions with company-fixed effects, probability weights on sex, age, income, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. The number of observations for the 60-km bandwidth: 2141; for the 15-km bandwidth: 556. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table A-2.3: Partitions and Cultural Outcomes, Placebo Test

Personal preferences:	patience	risk-taking	credit-taking	organization and discipline	moral value of work	practical value of work	economic traits in children	church attendance	belief in hell
Randomly assigned Prussian Partition Indicator	-0.047 (0.152)	-0.253 (0.173)	-0.056 (0.212)	0.003 (0.147)	-0.154 (0.190)	-0.010 (0.188)	-0.013 (0.013)	0.185 (0.151)	0.154 (0.244)
Prosocial preferences:	membership in organizations	activity in organizations	altruism	negative reciprocity	tax cheating justified	bribery justified	society unfair toward poor		
Randomly assigned Prussian Partition Indicator	0.069 (0.093)	0.004 (0.077)	-0.165 (0.169)	-0.020 (0.186)	-0.145 (0.216)	-0.225 (0.207)	-0.339+ (0.175)		
Trust:	generalized trust	trust Russians more than Germans	institutional trust	trust in schools, police, and courts	perception of school as objective				
Randomly assigned Prussian Partition Indicator	0.007 (0.174)	-0.034 (0.152)	-0.019 (0.113)	0.035 (0.067)	0.353* (0.178)				

Note: Individual-level data from the *Partitions of Poland Survey* limited to the bandwidth of 15 km in each direction from the historical Prussian-Russian border. The table reports coefficients on a binary indicator for the former Prussian partition in OLS regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients. In regressions with company-fixed effects, Probability weights on sex, age, income, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. The number of observations: 682. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table A-3.1: Partitions and Cultural Outcomes, Ancestry (bandwidth of 15 km)

Prussian only	mixed	Prussian only	mixed	Prussian only	mixed	Prussian only	mixed	Prussian only	mixed
patience		risk-taking		credit-taking		organization and discipline		moral value of hard work	
-0.088 (0.180)	-0.171 (0.197)	-0.096 (0.212)	-0.096 (0.218)	-0.013 (0.266)	0.121 (0.260)	-0.030 (0.184)	-0.107 (0.177)	-0.088 (0.239)	0.021 (0.233)
practical value of hard work		economic traits in children		church attendance		belief in hell		membership in organizations	
-0.121 (0.231)	0.046 (0.228)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.031+ (0.016)	0.073 (0.188)	0.097 (0.186)	0.336 (0.294)	0.322 (0.306)	0.231+ (0.129)	0.107 (0.097)
activity in organizations		altruism		negative reciprocity		tax cheating justified		bribery justified	
0.112 (0.096)	0.161+ (0.083)	-0.286 (0.214)	-0.041 (0.216)	0.031 (0.229)	-0.024 (0.232)	0.301 (0.276)	-0.331 (0.261)	0.028 (0.257)	-0.292 (0.255)
society unfair toward poor		generalized trust		trust Russians more than Germans		institutional trust		perception of schools as objective	
0.073 (0.209)	0.339 (0.222)	-0.197 (0.212)	0.312 (0.218)	0.171 (0.184)	-0.166 (0.189)	0.072 (0.140)	0.228+ (0.135)	-0.131 (0.223)	0.061 (0.219)

Note: Individual-level data from the *Partitions of Poland Survey* limited to the bandwidth of 15 km in each direction from the historical Prussian-Russian border. The table reports coefficients in OLS regressions on two indicators of ancestry: *Prussian only* indicates that all reported ancestors lived in municipalities of the former Prussian partition; *mixed* indicates ancestors from both partitions; the baseline is the group of respondents with all reported ancestors from municipalities of the former Russian partition. Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients. Probability weights on sex, age, income, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. Number of observations: 652. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table A-3.2: Partitions and Cultural Outcomes, Ancestry (Great-Grandfathers)

Prussian only	mixed	Prussian only	mixed	Prussian only	mixed	Prussian only	mixed	Prussian only	mixed
patience		risk-taking		credit-taking		organization and discipline		moral value of hard work	
0.134	0.052	0.060	0.080	-0.213	0.115	0.033	-0.256	0.124	0.237
(0.163)	(0.196)	(0.185)	(0.218)	(0.238)	(0.275)	(0.160)	(0.196)	(0.215)	(0.237)
practical value of hard work		economic traits in children		church attendance		belief in hell		membership in organizations	
0.173	0.351	0.004	0.002	0.174	-0.206	0.146	0.075	0.257*	0.018
(0.209)	(0.262)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.166)	(0.197)	(0.265)	(0.322)	(0.117)	(0.122)
activity in organizations		altruism		negative reciprocity		tax cheating justified		bribery justified	
0.198*	0.085	-0.126	0.041	0.035	-0.183	0.029	-0.331	-0.069	-0.054
(0.093)	(0.106)	(0.176)	(0.227)	(0.206)	(0.237)	(0.249)	(0.287)	(0.233)	(0.290)
society unfair toward poor		generalized trust		trust Russians more than Germans		institutional trust		perception of schools as objective	
0.481*	-0.047	-0.113	0.023	-0.009	-0.382+	0.021	0.201	0.093	0.265
(0.190)	(0.239)	(0.184)	(0.236)	(0.166)	(0.212)	(0.129)	(0.164)	(0.196)	(0.231)

Note: The table reports coefficients in OLS regressions on two indicators of ancestry: *Prussian only* indicates that all reported great-grandfathers lived in municipalities of the former Prussian partition; *mixed* indicates great-grandfathers from both partitions; the baseline is the group of respondents with all reported great-grandfathers from municipalities of the former Russian partition. Distance from the Prussian-Russian border is included as a control variable. Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients. Probability weights on sex, age, income, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. The observations come from the small dataset (with cities above 100 thousand citizens excluded). Number of observations: 652. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table A-4: Partitions and Cultural Outcomes, Age-Based Heterogeneity

Age <= 39	Age > 39	Age <= 39	Age > 39	Age <= 39	Age > 39	Age <= 39	Age > 39	Age <= 39	Age > 39
patience		risk-taking		credit-taking		organization and discipline		moral value of hard work	
-0.060	0.023	-0.141	-0.089	-0.203	-0.151	-0.074	-0.228	0.195	-0.269
(0.232)	(0.212)	(0.274)	(0.235)	(0.304)	(0.300)	(0.221)	(0.202)	(0.279)	(0.258)
practical value		economic traits		church attendance		belief in hell		membership	
-0.058	0.224	-0.002	0.024	0.129	-0.062	-0.292	0.416	0.168	0.451**
(0.280)	(0.263)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.213)	(0.229)	(0.346)	(0.362)	(0.155)	(0.111)
activity in organizations		altruism		negative reciprocity		tax cheating justified		bribery justified	
0.146	0.289**	-0.234	-0.269	-0.103	0.471+	-0.061	0.377	-0.262	0.496+
(0.120)	(0.096)	(0.265)	(0.234)	(0.273)	(0.259)	(0.355)	(0.293)	(0.317)	(0.287)
society unfair toward poor		generalized trust		trust Russians more than		institutional trust		perceive schools	
-0.204	0.076	-0.210	0.071	0.449*	0.127	0.192+	0.051	0.225	0.223
(0.265)	(0.237)	(0.249)	(0.234)	(0.210)	(0.222)	(0.108)	(0.090)	(0.281)	(0.244)

Note: Individual-level data from the *Partitions of Poland Survey* limited to the bandwidth of 15 km in each direction from the historical Prussian-Russian border. The table reports coefficients on a binary indicator for the former Prussian partition in OLS regressions according to formula (1). Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients (in parentheses). Probability weights on sex, age, income, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. Number of observations for Age <= 39: 345; for Age > 39: 330. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table A-5.1 Partitions and Income on Social Capital

Dependent variable: income				
	Binary indicator; 30-km bandwidth		Binary indicator; 15-km bandwidth	
indicator for Prussian Partition	103.741 (677.815)	-55.276 (673.890)	1882.121+ (996.840)	1701.893+ (983.904)
activity in organizations	1258.160** (422.766)	1259.410** (421.923)	1094.355* (546.330)	1013.769+ (524.977)
	Ancestry indicators; 30-km bandwidth		Ancestry indicators; 15-km bandwidth	
Prussian only ancestors	152.982 (905.721)	-0.777 (906.754)	2371.607+ (1427.103)	2239.968 (1416.726)
mixed ancestors	-1405.618+ (769.452)	-1608.623* (768.494)	-743.076 (976.383)	-956.982 (998.739)
activity in organizations	1386.461** (438.192)	1421.270** (441.962)	1262.817* (560.132)	1245.519* (554.887)

Note: Individual-level data from the *Partitions of Poland Survey* limited to the bandwidth of 30, and 15 km in each direction from the historical Prussian-Russian border. Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients. Probability weights on sex, age, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. The numbers of observations for partition indicator and 30 km: 1259; for partition indicator and 15 km: 682; for ancestry indicator and 30 km: 1211; for ancestry indicator and 15 km: 646.

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table A-5.2: Partitions and Income on Social Capital (Urbanization)

Dependent variable: income				
	Urban area; 15-km bandwidth		Rural area; 15-km bandwidth	
indicator for Prussian Partition	78.614 (933.501)	11.079 (941.685)	3990.331* (1872.843)	3527.862+ (1810.513)
activity in organizations	566.979 (349.210)	566.712 (351.046)	2008.026 (1230.481)	1699.498 (1178.401)

Note: Individual-level data from the *Partitions of Poland Survey* limited to the bandwidth of 15 km in each direction from the historical Prussian-Russian border. Heteroskedasticity-robust SE are below the coefficients. Probability weights on sex, age, unemployment, post-secondary education, and living in a rural municipality are applied to balance the structures of respondents from both partitions. The numbers of observations for urban: 352; for rural: 326. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Figure A-1.1: Partitions and Socioeconomic Outcomes










Figure A-1.2: Partitions and Economically Significant Cultural Outcomes, 1










Figure A-1.3: Partitions and Economically Significant Cultural Outcomes, 2







Figure A-1.4: Partitions and Economically Significant Cultural Outcomes, 3




Graphs by Indicator for Prussian Partition



Graphs by Indicator for Prussian Partition



Graphs by Indicator for Prussian Partition



Graphs by Indicator for Prussian Partition

REFERENCES

Alesina, A. and Fuchs-Schuendeln, N. 2005. “Good bye Lenin (or not?): The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences”. *American Economic Review*. Vol. 97, No. 4, September 2007, pp. 1507-1528.

Alesina, A., Giuliano, P. 2015. “Culture and Institutions”. *Journal Of Economic Literature* Vol. 53, No. 4, December 2015, pp. 898-944.

Alesina, A., Giuliano, P., Bisin, A. and Benhabib, J. 2011. “Preferences for Redistribution.” *Handbook of Social Economics*, 93-132. North Holland.

Algan, Y. Cahuc, P. 2010. “Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe. Inherited Trust and Growth”. *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 100, No. 5 (December 2010), pp. 2060-2092.

Andini, C. and Andini, M. 2019. “Social capital and growth: causal evidence from Italian municipalities”. *Journal of Economic Geography*, Volume 19, Issue 3, May 2019, Pages 619–653.

Atlas Geopolityczny. 2018. *Wielki Atlas Historii Polski 1918-2018*. Demart.

Backhaus, A. 2018. “Fading Legacies: Human Capital in the Aftermath of the Partitions of Poland”. Working Papers 0150, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).

Bartkowski, J. 2003. *Tradycja i Polityka*. Wydawnictwo Akademickie "ZAK" and Jerzy Bartkowski, Warszawa.

Becker, S.O., Boeckh, K., Hainz, C. and Woessmann, L. 2016. "The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy". *The Economic Journal*, 126: 40-74.

Becker, S.O., Grosfeld, I., Grosjean, P., Voigtländer, N. and Zhuravskaya, E. 2020. "Forced Migration and Human Capital: Evidence from Post-WWII Population Transfers". *American Economic Review*, vol 110(5), pp. 1430-1463. (*Ancestry Survey*)

Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. 2011. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and Socialization." In> Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin and Matthew O. Jackson editors: *Handbook of Social Economics*, Vol. 1A, The Netherlands: North-Holland, pp. 339-416.

Bukowski, P.. 2018. "How History Matters for Student Performance: Lessons from the Partitions of Poland." *Journal of Comparative Economics*, Volume 47, Issue 1, March 2019, pp. 136-175.

Czapinski J., Panek T. (Ed.). 2015. *Social Diagnosis*. Social Monitoring Council (2015).
Questionnaire. www.diagnoza.com

Davies, N. 2006. *God's Playground. A History of Poland*. Oxford University Press, New York.

Dell, M. 2010. “The persistent effects of Peru’s mining Mita.” *Econometrica* 78(6), pp. 1863–1903.

Doepke, M. and Zilibotti, F. 2008. “Occupational Choice and the Spirit of Capitalism”. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Volume 123, Issue 2, May 2008, pp. 747–793.

Dzialek. 2009. *Social Capital and Economic Growth in Polish Regions*. Munich Personal RePEc Archive.

Eberhardt, P. 2004. *Polska i jej granice. Z historii polskiej geografii politycznej*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin.

Falk, A., Becker, A., Dohmen, T., Enke, B., Huffman, D., Sunde, U. 2018. “Global Evidence on Economic Preferences”. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Volume 133, Issue 4, November 2018, pp. 1645–1692. (*Global Preferences Survey*)

Falk, A., Becker, A., Dohmen, T., Huffman, D., & Sunde, U. 2016. “The preference survey module: A validated instrument for measuring risk, time, and social preferences”. *IZA Discussion Paper* No. 9674.

Faustyn, A. 2014. “Impedimentum Catholicismi in the Law of Southern Voivodships of the Second Polish Republic”. *Czasopismo Prawno – Historyczne*. Tom LXVI – 2014 – Zeszyt 2.

Goebel, J., Grabka, M. M., Liebig, S., Kroh, M., Richter, D., Schröder, C., Schupp, J. 2019. The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik / Journal of Economics and Statistics*, 239(2), pp. 345-360.

Gorzela, G., Jałowicki, B. 1998. *Koniunktura gospodarcza i mobilizacja społeczna w gminach. Seria: Studia regionalne i lokalne, nr 58*. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Europejski Instytut Rozwoju Lokalnego i Regionalnego, s. 213. Warszawa.

Grabowski, W. 2019. “Determinants of Voting Results in Poland in the 2015 Parliamentary Elections”. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Volume 52, Issue 4, December 2019, pp. 331-342

Grosfeld, I. and Zhuravskaya, E. 2014. “Cultural vs. Economic Legacies of Empires: Evidence from the Partition of Poland”. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, Volume 43, Issue 1, February 2015, pp. 55-75

Hainmueller, J. 2012. Entropy Balancing for Causal Effects: A Multivariate Reweighting Method to Produce Balanced Samples in Observational Studies. *Political Analysis*, 20(1), pp. 25-46.

Herbst, M. and Rivkin, S. 2012. “Divergent Historical Experiences and Inequality in Academic Achievement: The Case of Poland”. *The Journal of Socio-Economics*, Volume 42, February 2013, pp. 1-12.

Hijmans, R.J., Cameron, S.E., Parra, J.L., Jones, P.G., Jarvis, A., et al. 2005. "Very High Resolution Interpolated Climate Surfaces for Global Land Areas". *International Journal of Climatology*, 25 (15), pp. 1965–1978.

Holzer, J. 1980. *Pozostałość granicy rozbiorowej w świadomości i kulturze materialnej ludności gminy Golub-Dobrzyń*. Warszawskie Centrum Studenckiego Ruchu Nauk, Warszawa.

Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile Version: <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp>. Madrid: JD Systems Institute.

Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. *World Values Survey: All Rounds - Country-Pooled Datafile Version*: <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp>. Madrid: JD Systems Institute.

Karbownik, B. and Kula, G. 2009. "The Efficiency of Local Governments' Expenditures on Public and Merit Goods". Narodowy Bank Polski.

Knack, S. and Keefer, P. 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation". *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 112, No. 4 (Nov., 1997), pp. 1251-1288.

Komusinski, S. 2010. Przekształcenia przestrzenne sieci pasażerskiego transportu kolejowego w latach 1998-2008." A doctoral dissertation. Cited in Wysokińska (2017).

Konopska-Struś, E. 2008. "Rola polskiej spółdzielczości bankowej w rozwoju rzemiosła w aspekcie historycznym." In: Jędrzej Chumiński and Krzysztof Popiński, *Gospodarcze i społeczne skutki zaborów Polski*. Wrocław, Poland: Gajt Wydawnictwo 1991 s.c., 2008.

Korys, P. 2018. *Poland from Partitions to EU Accession. A Modern Economic History, 1772-2004*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Krzemiński, S. 1894. *Prawo a bezprawie w zaborze rosyjskim*. Nakładem B.F. Lewickiego z Drukarni i Litografii Pillera i Spolki.

Lukowski, J. 1999. "The Partitions of Poland: 1772, 1793, 1795." Addison Wesley Longman Limited. London.

Macyra, R. 2008. "Przedsiębiorczość i etos pracy Wielkopolan a pragmatyzm w II RP." In: Jędrzej Chumiński and Krzysztof Popiński, 2008, *Gospodarcze i społeczne skutki zaborów Polski*. Gajt Wydawnictwo 1991 s.c., 2008. Wrocław.

Magocsi, P. R. 2018. *Historical Atlas of Central Europe. Third Revised and Expanded Edition*. University of Toronto Press, Toronto.

Materniak-Pawłowska, M. 2014. Z dziejów sądów przysięgłych na ziemiach polskich w XIX wieku. *Czasopismo Prawno-historyczne*. Poznan. Tom LXVI — 2014 — Zeszyt 1.

Marks, B. P. 2008. "Giełdy na ziemiach polskich pod zaborami (1817-1918)." In: Jędrzej Chumiński and Krzysztof Popiński, 2008, *Gospodarcze i społeczne skutki zaborów Polski*. Gajt Wydawnictwo 1991 s.c., 2008. Wrocław.

Miernik, G. 2008. "Dziedzictwo zaborów i jego przezwyciężenie w koncepcjach gospodarczych władz Polski Ludowej w okresie stalinizmu (wybrane problemy)." In: Jędrzej Chumiński and Krzysztof Popiński, 2008, *Gospodarcze i społeczne skutki zaborów Polski*. Gajt Wydawnictwo 1991 s.c., 2008. Wrocław.

Nunn, N. 2009. "The Importance of History for Economic Development". *Annual Review of Economics*. 2009; 1 (1) , pp. 65-92.

Nunn, N., Wantchekon, L. 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa". *American Economic Review*, Vol. 101, No. 7, December 2011, pp. 3221-52.

Padło, T. 2014. *Koniec Swiata*. Universitas.

Peisakhin, L. V. 2010. Living Historical Legacies: The 'Why' and 'How' of Institutional Persistence – The Case of Ukraine (September 1, 2010).

Popiński, K. 2008. "Wybrane aspekty kształcenia na poziomie wyższym na ziemiach polskich w okresie zaborów." In: Jędrzej Chumiński and Krzysztof Popiński, 2008, *Gospodarcze i społeczne skutki zaborów Polski*. Gajt Wydawnictwo 1991 s.c., 2008. Wrocław.

Schulze, G. G.; Zakharov, N. 2018. *Corruption in Russia - Historic Legacy and Systemic Nature*, CESifo Working Paper, No. 6864, Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich.

Sobczyński, M. 1993. "Stability of the Old Political Boundaries in the Cultural Landscape of Poland." *Zeszyty Instytutu Geografii Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania PAN* 14, pp. 1-111.

Sienkiewicz, W., Owczak, E. Wierczorek, M. 2018. *Wielki Atlas Historii Polski*. Demart S.A. Warszawa.

Tabellini, G. 2010. "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe". *Journal of the European Economic Association* Vol. 8, No. 4 (June 2010), pp. 677-716.

Wandycz, P.S. 1974. *The lands of partitioned Poland, 1795 - 1918. A history of East Central Europe*, P.F. Sugar and D.W. Treadgold, editors, v.7. University of Washington Press, Seattle.

Wolf, N. 2005. "Endowments vs Market Potential: What Explains the Relocation of Industry After the Polish Reunification in 1918?". *Explorations in Economic History*, Volume 44, Issue 1, January 2007, pp. 22-42.

Wysokińska, A. 2017. "Institutions or Culture? Lessons for Development from Two Natural Experiments of History".

Zdrada, J. 2005. *Historia Polski 1975-1914*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa.

Zurawski vel Grajewski, R. 2013. Poland in the Period of Partitions 1795–1914. In: *Poland. History, Culture and Society. Selected Readings*, ed. E. Bielawska-Batorowicz, Uniwersytet Łódzki, pp. 95-125.