Classifying the Indicators of Happiness in Quantitative Social Sciences

In quantitative social scientific literature, there seems to be little or a lack of philosophical reflection on the different types of indicators. In particular, it is not common to discuss whether the economic indicators are criteria or symptoms; and while there sometimes is discussion whether subjective or objective measures are correct, such discussions are not parts of broader theories of the human good. Instead, intellectual efforts of these scientists are focused on distilling causes from effects, on the internal and external validity of methods, and on the positivity or normativity of claims.

This paper investigates what, from the philosophical point of view, is conceptually sound or problematic about the use of indicators in quantitative social scientific research about happiness.

I classify the indicators according to two distinctions: criteria versus symptoms, from Ludwig Wittgenstein, and subjective versus objective, from Mark LeBar. In my analysis, I juxtapose these distinctions with distinctions more commonly made in economics, namely between causes and effects (or results) and between positive and normative statements.

I conclude that classifying indicators of happiness using the two distinctions from moral philosophy would be compatible with quantitative social scientific methods. Quantitative social scientific literature could benefit from reflecting on the qualities of the evidence collected and processed—especially at the stage of selecting indicators appropriate to the research question and at the stage of interpreting results, drawing generalized conclusions, and presenting policy implications.